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I. INTRODUCTION
Mental health professionals1 have been telling a lot of lawyer
jokes involving laboratory rats,2 pitbulls,5 skunks in the middle of
the road,4 and sharks.5 Often, lawyer stories increase as a profes-
sion's malpractice claims rise, as has been the case with the mental
health profession.0 The last two decades have produced significant
1. "Mental health professionals" is a somewhat uncertain term because a wide variety
of people provide mental health services of some sort. Everyone would include psychiatrists
and psychologists in the definition of mental health professionals. Even these professionals,
however, may be difficult to identify. All physicians can practice psychiatry, and many of
those physicians calling themselves psychiatrists are not board certified. Psychologists are
licensed by all states, buit in some states psychologists (without doctoral training) may not
be eligible for full independent practice, so the term "psychologist" is applied to a range of
professionals. Other professions that may fall in the category of mental health professions
include social workers, counselors, and psychiatric nurses. A variety of other psychothera-
pists, including expressive therapists, sex therapists, and pastoral counselors, also may be
considered mental health professionals. Even some bartenders claim to be mental health
professionals. (They contend that they are more readily available than psychiatrists, less
expensive, and much less likely to suggest that the "patients" give up drinking.) In this
article, the term generally refers to psychiatrists and psychologists, and occasionally to so-
cial workers, psychiatric nurses, and counselors. "Patients" refers to the consumers of all
mental health services. There is a debate concerning the proper name for these consumers. I
will use the traditional term "patients" in this paper even though some mental health pro-
fessionals do not use the term.
2. Some mental health professionals have suggested that psychological experiments be
performed on attorneys rather than rats. Proponents claim that lawyers are more plentiful
than lab animals, that torture or abuse of attorneys would cause no public outcry, and that
lab assistants are less likely to become attached to attorneys than to rats. In addition, they
claim, there are some things rats just won't do.
3. "What is brown and white and looks good on a lawyer?" "A pitbull."
4. Someone asked, "What is the difference between a dead skunk and a dead lawyer in
the middle of the road?" The mental health professional replied, "There are skid marks in
front of the skunk."
5. A minister, a mental health professional and a lawyer were adrift in a lifeboat in
shark infested waters when they spotted land. The currents changed and they were being
drawn back out to sea, and it was clear someone would have to jump in the water with a
rope and swim to shore to pull the boat in. As the minister prayed, the lawyer volunteered
for the dangerous mission and jumped in. The sharks did not attack. Indeed, they gave the
lawyer a lift on their backs. "Our prayers have been answered," cried the minister. "Prayer
had nothing to do with it," responded the mental health professional. "It was professional
courtesy."
6. See, e.g., Bonnie, Professional Liability and the Quality of Mental Health Care, 16
L. MED. & HEnATH CAR 229, 229 (1988) (noting that a lawyer in a gathering of health
professionals "can expect to be bombarded by complaints about the law of professional lia-
bility and the high cost of malpractice insurance").
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changes in the malpractice liability of mental health professionals
and the institutions in which they work. One commentator has de-
scribed the increased frequency of lawsuits and settlements, the
expansion of duties to nonpatient third parties, and the size of
some awards as "an avalanche of claims" that "is a crisis in the
making."7
Whether there will be a "crisis" may be debatable, but during
the 1990s the liability of mental health professionals and institu-
tions probably will expand.8 Any malpractice reforms to limit lia-
bility most likely will be more than offset by an increase in claims.
This increase will result from better definitions of mental health
standards of care, greater willingness of patients to seek compensa-
tion for injuries, and expanded liability to third parties harmed by
mental health patients.9 Physical injuries (e.g., suicides, homicides,
and harm from medications) will continue to be important due to
the size of damages in such cases. At the same time, patient expec-
tations of successful treatment and concerns over confidentiality
may increase liability for nonphysical injuries. Finally, the obliga-
tion of mental health institutions to supervise professionals prac-
ticing within the institutions, as well as expanded vicarious liabil-
ity, will tend to increase malpractice claims against these
institutions.I" In the past, mental health practitioners have been
protected from liability by a variety of legal rules and the stigma
associated with being a mental patient. Those protections are be-
ginning to disappear.
During the 1990s, the mental health and the legal professions
ought to develop alternatives to the current civil trial system. The
7. J. ROBERTSON, PSYCHIATRIC MALx.Acricz- LIABILITY oF MENTrAL HALTH PRoFEs-
SioNALS 5 (1988); see also 3 M. PERLm, MFNTAL DLsBU.rrv LAW: CIvIL Aim CRmu;hL (1989)
(providing an overview of the various types of mental health malpractice and concluding
that the situation is worsening). For additional excellent, recent reviews of mental health
malpractice, see . COHEN, IwPRACTicE A GuID FOR MENTAL HEALTH PRoFEssIoNs (1979);
B. FURROW, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980); B. SCHULTZ, LEGAL LIABILrY IN PsYcHo-
THERAPY (1982); J. S=ITH, MEDIcAL MALPRACTiCE PSYcHIATRIC CARE (1986).
8. Although many factors will tend to increase mental health malpractice claims, I
predict that the increase will be more gradual and not actually amount to a crisis. Refer to
notes 304-54 infra and accompanying text.
9. Refer to notes 210-33 infra and accompanying text. See generally Tancredi &
Weisstub, Malpractice in America: Toward a Restructuring of the Psychiatrist-Patient Re-
lationship, in 2 LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH: ITERNATIONAL PERSPE VsS 83 (D. Weisstub ed.
1984).
10. Malpractice claims against mental health institutions present especially difficult
questions. Refer to notes 261-99 infra and accompanying text.
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goal should be to compensate those injured in psychotherapy with-
out requiring that they reveal publicly a tremendous amount of
very private information from therapy. Reforms also should ad-
dress the difficulty of demonstrating to lay jurors the appropriate
standard of mental health care and proving causation and injury.
This article analyzes the current levels and kinds of mental
health malpractice claims. It also discusses the direction of individ-
ual and institutional malpractice in the 1990s and considers poten-
tial reforms. Finally, the article argues that the current system is
inadequate to deal with many mental health injuries and that pa-
tient plaintiffs should have the option of pursuing malpractice
claims in a private, less threatening forum.11
II. CURRENT LEVEL OF MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Despite the increases in mental health malpractice claims de-
scribed in this section, the number of claims remains low compared
with many other health care specialties." Obstetricians and
neurosurgeons would give up weekday golf to have the malpractice
premiums of mental health professionals. 13 During the first ten
years (1961-71) of the malpractice insurance program of the Amer-
ican Psychological Association, no malpractice claims were paid;
however, during the period 1976-1980, 122 claims were processed,
with estimated payments totalling $435,642.14 For many years,
malpractice actions against psychiatrists accounted for less than
11. Refer to notes 304-37 infra and accompanying text.
12. Precise information about mental health malpractice claims is difficult toobtain
for several reasons. First, some insurance carriers consider claim and loss information to be
proprietary and, therefore, are reluctant to give information in a meaningful way. Also, in-
surance does not cover some types of claims (e.g., sexual contact with patients), making it
difficult to obtain reliable data on these cases. Furthermore, mental health practitioners
belong to several different professions (including medicine, psychology, social work) and
possess various malpractice insurance plans and structures that vary from one discipline to
another. Finally, a significant number of practitioners work in areas that are self-insured
(e.g., state and federal agencies).
13. Cf. Slawson & Guggenheim, Psychiatric Malpractice: A Review of the National
Loss Experience, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 979, 981 (1984) (noting that the statistics showing
claims filed against psychiatrists for the reported period were probably understated because
the data did not include claims brought against V.A. or public hospital patients). See gener-
ally Deardorff, Cross & Hupprich, Malpractice Liability in Psychotherapy: Client and
Practitioner Perspectives, 15 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAc. 590 (1984) (discussing possi-
ble areas of liability for practicing psychotherapists); Watkins & Watkins, Malpractice in
Clinical Social Work, 1 BEHnAv. SCL & L. 55 (1983) (discussing the enormous potential for
malpractice suits against clinical social workers).
14. Slawson & Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 980.
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one percent of the claims fled against all physicians. 5 In the mid-
1970s, psychiatrists were sued at a rate of about 2.25 percent,"0 but
by the 1980s that rate had nearly doubled to four percent.17
Only a small percentage of negligent events result in any claim
being filed,1' and only a small proportion of those claims result in
any recovery.' 9 Additionally, most recoveries are fairly small, total-
ing less than $30,000, though jury verdicts may easily exceed that.
The size of verdicts appears to be increasing: a 1985 study reported
that psychiatric malpractice verdicts ranged from $75,000 to
$766,000, with an average yerdict of $306,737.20 As a result of the
increased number and size of claims, psychiatric lawsuits and in-
surance premiums doubled between 1981 and 1986.21 Other mental
health disciplines are experiencing similar trends.22
Mental health malpractice claims traditionally have been low
for a number of reasons: the elements of negligence-duty, causa-
tion, and injury-are often difficult to prove; technical legal doc-
trines sometimes interfere with potential claims; former patients
are reluctant to expose their mental health problems to the public
view of a civil trial; and the close relationship between patients
and mental health professionals makes patients reluctant to fle
15. Id.
16. AMA, MALPRAcTiCE N Focus (1975), quoted in J. RoBErsoN, supra note 7, at 5.
17. Perr, Psychiatric Malpractice Issues, in LEGAL ENCROACHMFN ON PSYCIUATxIC
PRAcrcp, 47, 51 (S. Rachlin ed. 1983); see also Nye, Gifford, Webb & Dewar, The Causes of
the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Fi-
nances, 76 GEo. L.J. 1495, 1545-49 (1988) (discussing rise in claims and rise in malpractice
insurance premiums).
18. See, e.g., P. DANzoN, MEDicAL MALPnACncEr THEORY. Evmn DcE AND PUnzC POLICY
19 (1985) (reporting that only 10% of persons with valid claims file suits for compensation);
H ARnv MEDICAL PRAccEc STUDY, PATIEims DOCTORS. AND LAwYEmS MEDICAL INRY.
MAuRAcncE LMGATION, AND PATnT COMESATmON IN NEW YoRK (1990) (reporting that
about one in eight of those injured through medical negligence filed suit and one in sixteen
received a jury award or settlement).
19. Slawson & Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 980.
20. See, e.g., J. ROBERTSoN, supra note 7, at 6 ("Million dollar verdicts have similarly
been rendered in recent years against psychiatrists."); Personal Injury Verdict Reviews, Jan.
13, 1986, at 1 (reporting that one in 25 psychiatrists could expect to be sued, compared with
one in 50 in 1979).
21. Personal Injury Verdict Reviews, supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., Andrade & Andrade, Professional Liability of the Psychiatric Nurse, 7 J.
PSYcHATRY & L. 141, 142 (1979) (commenting on the expanding liability of psychiatric
nurses); Creighton, The Malpractice Problem, 9 NuasING CLINIcs N. A. 425, 426 (1974)
(commenting on the increase of malpractice claims against nurses); Gerhart & Brooks, So-
cial Workers and Malpractice: Law, Attitudes, and Knowledge, 66 CASnwoMu J. CoISa.w.
Soc. WoRK 413 (1985); Watkins & Watkins, supra note 13; Watkins & Watldns, Negligent
Endangerment: Malpractice in the Clinical Context, 3 J. IiNDE. Soc. WORK 35 (1989).
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claims. Negligence requires a standard of professional care against
which the actions of the defendant-professional can be measured.
Liability exists only if the professional has failed to provide the
same care as would a reasonably prudent professional.2 The stan-
dard of practice for mental health professionals is not as clearly or
precisely defined as it is in many areas of medicine.24 For instance,
the standard of practice for treatment of acute appendicitis is
fairly uniform and clear; the standard of practice for treatment of
schizophrenia is not.25 The large number of "schools of thought" in
psychotherapy complicates efforts to define a clear standard of
care.26 The absence of a clear "correct" treatment makes it difficult
to assess the reasonableness of the therapist.2 7
Proving causation may be equally difficult.2 8 The causes of
emotional and psychological injuries are often difficult to identify
23. See Federici & Doering, Psychiatrists' Standard of Care, 10 AM. J. FORENSIC PSy-
CHIATRY 5 (1989); see, e.g., Rule v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472, 478 (1957) (re-
quiring a higher standard of care for a surgeon holding himself out as a specialist); McCar-
thy v. Boston City Hosp., 358 Mass. 639, 266 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1971) (requiring specialists to
exercise the degree of skill of the average professional practicing that specialty).
24. Commentators have criticized the absence of clear standards. See, e.g., 3 D. HOAN,
THE REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS: A REvIEW OF MALPRACTICE SUITS IN THE UNITED
STATES 27 (1979) ("As long as therapists restrict their practices to talk, interpretations, and
advice, they will remain relatively immune from suit, no matter how poor their advice, how
damaging their comments, or how incorrect their interpretations."); Knapp & VandeCreek,
Malpractice as a Regulator of Psychotherapy, 18 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, REs. & PRAC.
354 (1981); Note, Malpractice in Psychotherapy: Is There a Relevant Standard of Care?, 35
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 251, 253 (1984) (concluding that the very fact of change as a character-
istic of psychotherapy would appear to defy the notion of a definitive standard of care).
25. See, e.g., Note, supra note 24, at 253. The practical problem of applying a stan-
dard of care in psychiatric malpractice cases is noted in Modlin, Forensic Psychiatry and
Malpractice, 18 BULL. Ah. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 153 (1990) (reviewing malpractice cases).
26. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Calvin, 83 Cal. App. 3d 529, 147 Cal. Rptr. 905, 907 (1978)
(defining standard of care for schools of neurosurgery); Nelson v. Dahl, 174 Minn. 574, 576,
219 N.W. 941, 942 (1928) (setting standards of care for schools of chiropracty); Hansen v.
Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 P. 282, 284 (1920) (setting standard of care for Chinese herb doctor).
See also 3 M. PERLIN, supra note 7, at 13-14 (identifying more than 200 forms of mental
health "schools"); Paquin, The Malpractice of Family Therapy: An Analysis of Two
Schools, 12 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 21, 27, 33-48 (1988) (describing in detail the special legal
problems that can arise from the family therapy "school of thought").
27. See Federici & Doering, supra note 23, at 6-7; Leesfield, Negligence of Mental
Health Professionals: What Conduct Breaches Standards of Care, 23 TRIAL 57 (1987);
Note, supra note 24, at 253.
28. See generally Paquin, supra note 26, at 50-52 (discussing three problems with
proving causation: (1) differentiating between therapist's and patient's responsibility, (2)
determining substantiality of therapist's actions as cause, and (3) presumptions of patient's
defectiveness prior to treatment).
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with certainty.29 Therefore, a patient claiming therapy-related in-
jury may not be able to demonstrate that the faulty therapy
caused the harm.30 Additionally, because patients generally suffer
from mental problems before seeking therapy, any psychological
injury may appear to be part of the pre-existing mental illness
rather than the result of malpractice.3'
Damages also may be hard to prove.2 Emotional injuries are
very real and painful, but to a jury, they are not generally so obvi-
ous or gruesome as physical injuries.3 3 "A mangled limb or scarred
body presents to a jury dramatic evidence of injury; a mangled
psyche is much less evident.""4 Furthermore, the law traditionally
has been reluctant to recognize emotional or mental injuries, ex-
cept when they relate to physical harm.3 5 Thus, the large verdict
awards in mental health cases occur most often when clear physi-
cal injuries exist, such as in failure-to-prevent-suicide cases,30 pre-
scription drug cases,3 7 and Tarasoff liability cases.38
In the past, a number of other traditional legal doctrines have
helped reduce the number of mental health malpractice claims.
29. S. Shr & R. MEYER, LAw, B HAvio, AND MmrAL HaALH T PoucY AND PRAcncns
8 (1987).
30. Id.; see also 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 24, at 26 (proving that faulty therapy proxi-
mately caused patient's distress is enormous task).
31. Neiland, Malpractice Liability of Psychiatric Professionals, I Am J. FoRENsic
PSYCHATRY 22 (1979).
32. See Paquin, supra note 26, at 52-57 (discussing unique problems associted with
psychiatric malpractice damages).
33. S. SmrrH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 8-9; see also 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 24, at
26 (emotional distress damages alone are particularly hard to prove); J. Smem, supra note 7.
34. S. SMrr & PL MEEsupra note 29, at 9.
35. Id.; W. KLEmON, D. DOBBS, R. KEEr0N & D. OwEN, Paossmn & KEToN ON noE LAw
OF ToRTs § 12 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PaossER & KEON ON Tors]; see also Kineen &
Locke, Expanding the Horizons of Psychic Injury, TRAL, Feb. 1980, at 36, 37 (before a
tortfeasor could be liable for infliction of emotionally related injuries, plaintiff had to show
physical impact); Comment, The Increasingly Disparate Standards of Recouery for Negli-
gently Inflicted Emotional Injuries, 52 U. C. L. RIv. 1017, 1017 (1983) (noting that courts
traditionally denied recovery absent physical injury to patient).
36. Cf. 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 24, at 406 (mean recovery in malpractice suits involv-
ing suicides through 1977 was $27,126).
37. Cf. id. at 404 (mean recovery in cases through 1977 for negligent administration of
drugs was $170,000).
38. In Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976), the California court imposed upon therapists a duty to take reason-
able steps to protect the intended victims of psychiatric patients. See also id. at 21 (noting
that cases involving diagnoses for lack of dangerousness produced recoveries at $50,000-plus
level). For a discussion of the Tarasoff case, refer to notes 212-33 infra and accompanying
text.
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Examples include the doctrine of limited duty as encompassed in
the "rescue rule," se suicide as a "superseding" cause,40 and sover-
eign and charitable immunities.41 These doctrines precluded liabil-
ity even where a mental health professional acted carelessly.42 The
weakening of these defenses is partly responsible for the increase
in mental health malpractice claims.
Several other factors limit the number of malpractice claims
against mental health practitioners. One is the reluctance of pa-
tients to have their emotional problems and histories aired in a
public forum. 4  By filing a malpractice lawsuit, plaintiffs lose any
testimonial privilege covering their mental health care.' Public tri-
als make patients' mental conditions matters of public record and
expose friends and family to information previously held confiden-
tial. 5 Understandably, patients are generally more reluctant to
39. See, e.g., PROSSER & KFM'ON ON TORTS, supra note 35, § 56 (rescue rule provides
that one person is not obligated to rescue another person in danger of losing his life even if
the rescue can be accomplished without risk to the potential rescuer). However, this rule
does not apply to cases in which a special relationship exists between the parties. Id. For
example, this relationship exists when the potential rescuer has caused the other party to be
at risk or is the parent or caretaker of the other. Id.
40. See, e.g., id. § 44 (the common law considered the act of suicide to be an inten-
tional act which broke the causal link between the negligence of the tortfeasor and the
injury).
41. See id. § 133 (noting that virtually all states now reject complete charitable immu-
nity); id. § 131 (noting that while sovereign immunity continues to exist in some form in
most states, voluntary waiver and judicial decisions have substantially reduced its negative
impact).
42. See, e.g., Bellows v. State, 37 A.D.2d 342, 325 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226-27 (1971) (even
though former prisoner may have received inadequate psychiatric care for propensity to
commit sex offenses while he was incarcerated, his suit against the state nonetheless failed
because the state had not waived immunity).
43. S. SmrTH & R. EYR, supra note 29, at 9; see also Smith, Constitutional Privacy
in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WAsm L. Ray. 1, 29 n.176 (1980) (noting that patient's anxiety
concerning the release of therapy information may result from psychotherapist's use of
terms which have a negative connotation to the public).
44. See, e.g., Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On
Giving With One Hand and Removing With the Other, 75 K. LJ. 473, 514-16 (1987) (the
patient-litigant exception waives the testimonial privilege between psychotherapist and pa-
tient when the holder of the privilege brings mental condition or state into question). In a
mental health malpractice action, the plaintiff patient would not only lose therapy privileges
concerning the therapy on which the malpractice claim was based, but he might also lose
privileges for any other therapy that is relevant to the malpractice case. In practical fact,
the defendant could seek therapy-related information from the plaintiff with very little limi-
tation. Id.; see also Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture of
Misguided Hope, 23 CAT& U.L REv. 649, 657 (1974) (noting that patient waives testimonial
privilege by making a legal issue of his mental condition).
45. See Smith, supra note 43, at 30 (noting that psychotherapy patient has high ex-
pectation that information revealed in therapy will remain private due to ethics codes).
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have their mental conditions discussed in public than their physi-
cal ailments.4
Relationships between therapists and patients also limit mal-
practice claims.47 Such relationships are typically much closer in
psychotherapy than they are in other health care contexts.48 This
closeness makes patients more reluctant to file suit against ther-
apists than, for instance, against a surgeon whom the patient sees
only briefly before and after surgery. Many psychotherapists see
fewer patients than do other health care workers, thus reducing
their exposure to liability.49
The increase in malpractice claims in the 1970s and 1980s re-
flects the erosion of several of these protections against mental
health malpractice. The degree to which such erosion continues
will determine the direction of mental health malpractice in the
1990s.
Ill. TYPES AND AREAS OF MALPRACTICE CLAIS
Malpractice claims may be divided in two ways: (1) by the le-
gal causes of action underlying liability and (2) by the activity or
therapy involved in the injury. Unfortunately, since courts and
commentators have not always drawn this distinction clearly, some
confusion has resulted. The malpractice matrix reproduced in the
Appendix illustrates the interaction between types of liability and
areas of practice.5
46. See, e.g., Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 1966 DU=E LJ. 696, 696 (cit-
ing natural reluctance of patients to reveal psychiatric history as reason for absence of case
law on psychiatric malpractice); Comment, The Liability of Psychiatrists for Malpractice,
36 U. Prrr. L Rv. 108, 131 (1974) (citing patient shame as reason for lack of malpractice
actions against psychiatrists); Note, Medical Malpractice: The Liability of Psychiatrists, 48
NoTRe DAtm L Rav. 693, 696-703 (1973) (scarcity of actions for negligently administered
psychiatric therapy may be result of people's reluctance to expose p3ychiatric history).
47. See S. SmTH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 9; May & Stengel, Who Sues Their
Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grieuances, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 105, 115-18 (1990)
(noting a number of individual factors that relate to the decision to file suit in malpractice
cases).
48. See, e.g., K. PoPE & J. Bousoutrsos. SExuAL IT yCv Bmms N THwwS AND
PATIENTS 22, 23 (1986) (noting that while a doctor may see a patient's most private body
parts, a therapist may "see" a patient's deepest secrets); see also Pope, Keith-Spiegel &
Tabachnick, Sexual Attraction to Clients, 41 AL. PSYCHOLOxsT 147, 155 (1986) (finding
clear evidence that male and female psychologists are sexually attracted to patients).
49. For a discussion of other factors reducing the risk of malpractice claims, see S.
Sm sH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 8-9.
50. Refer to Appendix infra.
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A. Legal Basis of Liability
Negligence is the most common form of malpractice liability.""
In negligence cases, the patient (or third party) claims that a
mental health professional did not act as a reasonably prudent
professional would under the circumstances, and as a consequence,
the patient (or third party) suffered injury. However, not every
bad outcome or mistake results in liability; negligence liability re-
sults only when unreasonable errors cause injuries.2 The doctrine
of informed consent is a special form of negligence liability. 3 In-
formed consent to medical treatment has received considerable at-
tention in recent years," but its application to psychotherapy has
not been fully defined.5 5 Additionally, malpractice claims may arise
51. See, e.g., J. MALCOLM, TREATMENT CHOICES AND INFORMED CONSENT. CURRENT CON-
TROVERSlES IN PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, 5 (1988) (typical malpractice case in-
volves physician negligence).
52. S. SMITH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 10; see also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (therapy regarding mental illness is not a perfect science); Pike v.
Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898) (law holds a physician liable for an
injury to his or her patient resulting from his or her failure to exercise reasonable care)
(emphasis added); Carroll v. Richardson, 201 Va. 157, 163, 110 S.E.2d 193, 197 (1959) (doc.
tor not liable for lab technician's failure to advise patient, who subsequently fainted, not to
stand up after his blood was drawn, because no evidence supported a custom among doctors
to so advise).
53. See generally Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An
Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 407, 408-17 (1980) (discussing history of
and modem trends in the doctrine of informed consent); Note, The Doctrine of Informed
Consent Applied to Psychotherapy, 72 GEo. LJ. 1637, 1641-42 (1984) (theories of recovery
under doctrine of informed consent include: (1) battery, when patient did not give consent
or was incompetent to give consent and (2) negligence when the doctor did not give the
patient sufficient information).
Liability for the absence of consent, and the doctrine of consent to experimental treat-
ment first arose in Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767), in which
the court held that "a patient should be told what is about to be done to him." Liability for
the absence of informed consent is now firmly established by common law and statute. See
Meisel & Kabnick, supra, at 408-09, 414. The doctrine applies to psychotherapy. See Note,
supra, at 1637-38.
54. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir.) (to be legally
effective, the physician must give the patient sufficient information to allow him to make a
reasonably informed judgment on whether to accept treatment; such information includes:
(1) the nature of the proposed treatment; (2) the major risks and benefits associated with
the treatment; (3) reasonable alternative forms of treatment; (4) the consequences of no
treatment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
55. Cf. J. MALCOLM, supra note 51, at 58-60 (noting that while parameters of informed
consent are well understood, defining the term in the context of psychiatric malpractice is
difficult); Reamer, Informed Consent in Social Work, 32 Soc. WORK 425, 425 (1987) (noting
that despite the commitment of social workers to the concept of self-determination, social
work literature lacks research into the manner in which a client gives informed consent); see
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from intentional torts such as battery,56 intentional infliction of
mental distress,57 or false imprisonment.58 However, these claims
are infrequent.59
Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, liability exists for those who act
under color of state law to deprive someone of federal rights.10
Mental health professionals working or consulting for a state en-
tity61 may incur liability if their conduct or deliberate indifference
interferes with someone's federal rights. 2 Zinermon v. Burch,5 a
recent Supreme Court decision, illustrates the potential relevance
of section 1983 claims. The Court held that section 1983 liability
might be imposed if clearly incompetent patients are held under
"voluntary" hospitalization."
Contract liability infrequently arises from mental health
care. 65 For example, a psychiatrist who warrants to a patient that
electro convulsive therapy ("ECT") is perfectly safe may be mak-
ing a contractual guarantee.6 6 Such warranty cases, though not un-
known, are unusual.67 Common reassurances that are part of a
also Note, supra note 41, at 1663 (noting that doctrine of informed consent, which functions
as a barrier against abuse in medical settings, has not generally arisen in context of psycho-
therapist-patient relationships).
56. Battery involves the intentional touching of someone in an offensive or harmful
way without that person's consent. PRossER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 35, § 9.
57. Intentional infliction of emotional stress occurs when (a) someone engages in out-
rageous conduct; (b) the actor intends the conduct to cause severe emotional pain; and (c)
the conduct causes severe emotional pain. Id. § 12.
58. False imprisonment is the intentional restraining or confining of another without
consent or legal authority. Id. § 12.
59. See 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 24, at 391 (during 1970-77, patients brought negli-
gence actions almost 60% of the time, while battery actions, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and false imprisonment claims when combined constituted less than 15% of
psychotherapist malpractice actions).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) ("Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance
[or] regulation ... subjects ... [anyone] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.").
61. Cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988) (holding that § 1983 applies to profes-
sionals who provide contract services but are not full-time state employees).
62. Refer to notes 13949 and 335-37 infra and accompanying text. There are several
good faith defenses available to therapists. For an excellent review of § 1983, including the
important issues of § 1983 cases tried in state courts, see S. STFNoLAss. SECnoN 1983 Lm-
GATION IN STATE COURTS (1989).
63. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
64. Id. at 990.
65. See, e.g., J. SmrTH, supra note 7, at 17-21, 28-31.
66. Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917, 918 (1958) (psychiatrist's statement that shock
treatment is "perfectly safe" may be a warranty).
67. See, e.g., id. (involving psychiatrist's warranty regarding shock treatment); Rosen-
blum v. Cherner, 219 A.2d 491, 491 (D.C. App. 1966); Gould v. Concord Ho3p., 126 N.H.
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good professional manner ("bedside manner") are not contracts."
The issue is whether a reasonable person would have understood
the assurances as a promise and an inducement to undertake a
course of action or therapy.69 The assurances may be particularly
subject to liability if the professional attempts to persuade the cli-
ent to agree to an unusual or experimental treatment. 0 "Treat-
ment contracts," in which the patient agrees to certain undertak-
ings as a part of therapy,71 seldom are legally enforceable contracts
because they generally do not contain one or more of the essential
contractual elements.72
Other legal concepts relevant to malpractice liability include
defamation, 3 the right of privacy (particularly public disclosure of
private facts and false light),7 4 and the antitrust laws.75 Addition-
ally, new legal problems continue to arise from mental health
treatment. In at least two instances in recent years, formal actions
have been taken against mental health professionals for insider
405, 493 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1985).
68. See Cirafici v. Goffen, 85 I. App. 3d 1102, 407 N.E.2d 633, 637 (1st Dist. 1980);
Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816, 823 (1957).
69. See, e.g., Stewart, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d at 823.
70. See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641, 642-43 (1929).
71. The patient-therapist or patient-hospital relationship is generally at least an im.
plicit contract. Cf. Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029, 1030 (1931) (sur-
geon's agreement with a patient can be called a contract).
72. See S. SmrTH & R. MEYET, supra note 29, at 20; Cf. Commonwealth v. Mayer, 270
Pa. Super. 406, 411 A.2d 789 (1979) (involving revocation of probation because of violation
of a mental health "treatment contract").
73. See, e.g., Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170, 1179-81 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(qualified privilege to disclose employee information in psychiatric report), afl'd, 629 F.2d
586 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Di Cara, 329 F. Supp. 439, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (government
physician not immune from suit for defamation); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d
814, 817-21 (1958) (psychiatrist's book detailing patient's therapy constituted an unlawful
invasion of the common law right of privacy); see also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra
note 35, § 824-29.
74. Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (1977) (disclosure of informa-
tion by psychiatrist to patient's flancee); see also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note
35, § 63-64; Egar, Psychotherapists' Liability for Extrajudicial Breaches of Confidentiality,
18 Atm. L. Rv. 1061, 1061 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476,
481-85, (4th Cir. 1980) (insurance carrier may require psychologist's fees to be billed
through a physician), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); Ohio v. Joint Comm'n on Accredita-
tion of Hosps. [Jan.-June], Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 948, at D-2 (Jan. 24,
1980); see also McGuire & Moore, Private Regulation in Mental Health-The JCAH and
Psychologists in Hospitals, 7 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 235, 248-49 (1983); Miller, Recent Develop-
ments in Antitrust: Challenges to Medical Autonomy, 41 NEw DIRECTOR MENTAL HEaLTH
SERvWCEs 69 (1989).
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trading securities violations.76 The professionals in these cases re-
ceived information from patients who were insiders, or their fami-
lies, and traded in securities based on that information.77
Though not widely accepted, some commentators have sug-
gested that malpractice should be based on strict liability.78 It is
not clear how such strict liability, in practice, would solve many of
the problems of the current system. Although strict liability and
no-fault systems may reduce the need to determine fault, they are
still causation-based programs. As such, these systems rely on the
courts' ability to determine when treatment caused an injury and
when something else (e.g., a pre-existing condition) was the
cause.79 Therefore, mental health malpractice plaintiffs may en-
counter as much difficulty proving causation in strict liability as in
negligence.
B. Areas of Malpractice Liability
Activities that give rise to malpractice liability vary among
mental health professions. Psychiatrists face liability resulting
from the use of electroconvulsive therapy and drugs, risks that
psychologists and social workers usually do not encounter.80 On the
other hand, psychiatrists do not often face liability related to test
development and validation. Although commentators have focused
attention on liability for physical interventions (e.g., ECT and
drugs),' a substantial portion of the claims filed against mental
health professionals arise from failure to prevent suicide; errors in
diagnosis, treatment, and evaluation; breach of confidentiality; and
76. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 272 (S.DN.Y. 1990) (p3ychia-
trist traded on inside information received from a patient who was the wife of a business
executive); N.Y. Times, June 1, 1986, § 12, at 47, coL 3 (Connecticut psychiatrist received
information from a patient).
77. Willis, 737 F. Supp. at 272; N.Y. Times, supra note 76, § 12, at 47, coL 3.
78. E.g., B. FuRROw, supra note 7, at 81-104 (1980); Furrow, Defective Mental Treat-
ment: A Proposal for the Application of Strict Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58 B.U.L.
Rxv. 391, 392 (1979); Comment, Injuries Precipitated By Psychotherapy: Liability Without
Fault as a Basis for Recovery, 20 S)J. REv. 401, 401 (1975).
79. Refer to notes 371-79 infra and accompanying text.
80. Few claims have been filed against psychologists based on prescription drug use or
ECT. Wright, Psychologists and Professional Liability (Malpractice) Insurance, 36 A&L
PSYCHOLOGIST 1485, 1488-93 (1981).
81. E.g., Slawson & Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 979-81; Wright, supra note 80. But
cf. Taub, Psychiatric Malpractice in the 1980s: A Look at Some Areas of Concern, 11 L.
MED. & HEmTH Cak 97, 97 (1983) (cautioning that these data may be outdated or
incomplete).
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having sexual contact with, or otherwise taking unfair advantage
of, patients."2
1. Failure to prevent suicide. Mental health professionals
must act reasonably to diagnose and supervise patients who are at
risk for suicide."3 This duty arises out of the therapeutic relation-
ship with the patient.8 4 The negligence may result, for example,
from unreasonable failure to do any of the following: Adequately
examine the patient; recognize common indicia of potential suicide;
or appropriately supervise, restrain, or treat the patient.80 Hospi-
tals and other institutions also have a duty to restrain and super-
vise potentially suicidal patients.8 6
Professionals are not required to prevent all suicides; they
need only take reasonable steps to do so.s1 Courts increasingly rec-
ognize that the threat of suicide must be balanced against other
risks and values, including freedom from restraint or the risks of
some medications. As one court noted: "Calculated risks of neces-
sity must be taken if the modem and enlightened treatment of the
mentally ill is to be pursued intelligently and rationally. Neither
the hospital nor the doctor are insurers of the patient's health and
82. Various lists purport to enumerate the most common areas of mental health mal-
practice claims. See, e.g., Slawson, The Clinical Dimension of Psychiatric Malpractice, 14
PsycHsATmc ANNALS 358, 362 (1984) (listing the order of the most common claims as im-
proper treatment, drug reactions, patient suicide, failure to restrain adequately, improper
commitment, breach of confidentiality and libel). Another list ranks the claims as suicide,
improper diagnosis, sexual misconduct, breach of confidentiality, death, fracture, attempted
suicide, missed diagnosis and homicide. Private correspondence with Dr. Phillip Resnick
and a malpractice carrier. A later version lists the order as negligent treatment, suicide,
improper medications, misdiagnosis, negligent supervision, negligent confinement, undue fa-
miliarity, breach of confidentiality and lack of informed consent. Id. See also APA Monitor,
Aug. 1987, at 39, col. 1 (listing sexual impropriety and incorrect treatment as the most com-
mon claims against psychologists).
83. See Abille v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 703, 706-08 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Meier v.
Ross Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 522-23, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903, 907 (1968); Pisel v.
Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1, 10-16 (1980).
84. See, e.g., Abille, 482 F. Supp. at 706-08.
85. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 82; Wright, supra note 80.
86. See Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical Center, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d
193, 196, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (1967); Pisel, 430 A.2d at 14-15. If a potentially suicidal
mentally ill person commits suicide while incarcerated by the state, and the suicide is
caused by the state's deliberate indifference to the need for treatment (e.g., withholding
medicine), section 1983 liability may be imposed. Greason v. I~emp, 891 F.2d 829, 838-39
(11th Cir. 1990).
87. See Berman & Cohen, Suicide and Malpractice: Expert Testimony and the Stan-
dard of Care, 14 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAc. 6, 6 (1983); Kapp & Vandercreek, Mal-
practice Risks with Suicidal Patients, 20 PSYCHoTHeRAsy 274, 274 (1983).
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safety."ss However, risks must be reasonable. The problem mental
health professionals encounter is that in hindsight the risk of sui-
cide often appears more "obvious" than it did before the event.""
2. Electroconvulsive therapy. In the past, ECT raised such
malpractice concerns that some insurance companies applied
surcharges specifically to cover it.90 The current claims arising
from ECT do not justify this fear."1 Several theories of negligence
provide the basis for ECT claims. Psychiatrists can incur liability
because of failure to obtain proper informed consent, prescribing
unnecessary ECT, or negligently administering it."2
When psychiatrists administer unneeded ECT, patients are
subject to unnecessary risks, and psychiatrists may be liable for
any injuries that result. For example, prescribing ECT to treat
Alzheimer's disease would be negligent because it is not effective
against that disease." The use of ECT with patients for whom it is
contraindicated (such as patients with some forms of organic brain
damage) would also be negligent.9 Furthermore, a therapist who
does not administer ECT in a reasonably careful way will be sub-
ject to liability under usual negligence principles for any resulting
88. Baker v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (S.D. Iowa 1964), afl'd, 343 F.2d
222 (8th Cir. 1965); see also Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283, 1292-96 (M.D. Fla.
1976), rev'd, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978), later proceedings, 631 F.2d 34 (5th Cr. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Fiederlein v. New York Health & Hosps. Corp., 80
A.D.2d 821, 437 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1981), afl'd, 56 N.Y.2d 573, 435 N.E_2d 393, 450
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1982).
89. Arkes, Guilmette, Faust & Hart, Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIE
PSYCHOLOGY 305, 305 (1988); Bursztajn, Gutheil, Brodky & Swagerty, "Magical Thinking,"
Suicide, and Malpractice Litigation, 16 BuL. AmL AcAD. PsycHiATRY & L. 369, 369 (1988);
Wexler & Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health
Malpractice Litigation. Some Preliminary Observations, 7 Bmuv. ScL & L. 485 (1989).
90. See Slawson & Guggengeim, supra note 13, at 981.
91. Id.
92. See Horan & Milligan, Recent Developments in Psychiatric Malpractice, 1 BmmAv.
ScL & L. 23 (1983); Per, Liability and Electroshock Therapy, 25 J. FoEN.sic Sc 503, 511
(1980); see also Taub, Electroconvulsive Therapy, Malpractice, and Informed Consent, 15
J. oF PSYCmATRY & L. 7, 21 (1987) (discussing informed consent); Winslade, Liston, Ro=s &
Weber, Medical, Judicial, and Statutory Regulation of ECT in the United States, 141 Am
J. PSYcHATRY 1349, 1352-53 (1984) (discussing competency and consent).
93. Cf. S. SmTrH & IL MEYER, supra note 29, at 94-96 (suggesting that psychiatrists
might use ECT on an experimental basis to treat certain conditions but should conduct such
experimental use in strict conformity with the requirements for human experiments).
94. AmcAN PsYcHiATRic Ass'N, TASK FORCE REPORT No. 14, ELEcRocowaswE
THERAPY (1978). See generally NATiONAL INST. OF MENTAL H Tn, EuxCro-CoNvums.v
THERAPY. CONsEsus DrmrOrrsNT CONFERENCE (1985) (general discussion on research ad-
vances and implications arising from the use of ECT).
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injuries. For example, a therapist who neglects to give medication
to protect a patient from harm due to extreme convulsions may be
subject to liability if the patient suffers a fracture."
3. Prescribing drugs. The use of psychoactive prescription
drugs is a potential source of malpractice litigation because of the
risk of harm to patients." The bases of liability are similar to those
described for ECT: failure of informed consent, inappropriate and
unnecessary prescription, and negligent administration of drugs . 7
By definition, prescription drugs involve risks, and improperly pre-
scribing them or failing to give adequate instruction poses an un-
necessary risk to patients. 8
4. Psychosurgery. Psychosurgery, once a controversial physi-
cal intervention of some importance, is less significant now because
it is seldom performed. Presently, it exists as an experimental pro-
cedure and is, therefore, subject to special regulation." Thus, if
psychosurgery were undertaken now without extraordinarily com-
plete informed consent, review, and care, the doctor would be sub-
ject to liability.100
95. See, e.g., Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 637, 131 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1963) (psychia-
trist may be held liable for failing to discover a vertebra fracture resulting from the first of a
series of electroshock therapy sessions); cf. Annotation, Malpractice in Connection With
Electroshock Treatment, 94 A.L.R.3d 317 (1979) (discussing various bases of liability that
may result from use of electroshock therapy).
96. Cf. Slawson & Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 980 (reporting that medication
claims constitute more than one-third of malpractice claims arising from the major proce-
dures employed in psychiatry).
97. See, e.g., Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d 411, 417, 303
N.E.2d 392, 396 (1973) (holding defendant liable for negligent administration of intravenous
solution); Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 921-23 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (holding defendant
liable for failure to obtain informed consent); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 144, 179
N.W.2d 288, 291 (1970) (negligent instructions to family regarding how to administer drugs
to discharged patient); Kramer, Psychiatry, Psychology, and the Law, 1988 PERS. INJ. Rrv.
150; Mills & Eth, Legal Liability with Psychotropic Drug Use: Extrapyramidal Syndromes
and Tardive Dyskinesia, 48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 28, 30-31 (1987) (informed consent);
Tancredi, Malpractice and Tardive Dyskinesia: Conceptual Dilemmas, 8 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLooY 715, 735-45 (1988) (informed consent).
98. See Appleton, Legal Problems in Psychiatric Drug Prescription, 124 Am. J. Psy-
cHiATRY 877, 879-80 (1968); Wettstein, Tardive Dyskinesia and Malpractice, 1 BEHAV, SCL
& L. 85 (1983).
99. S. SMrrIH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 107-08; see also Comment, Psychosur-
gery: The Rights of Patients, 23 Loy. L. REv. 1007, 1017 (1987) (stating that institutional
review boards may impose limitations on psychosurgery because of the potential for its
misuse).
100. See S. SMrrH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 105-08.
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5. Inadequate diagnosis. Mental health malpractice may re-
sult from a therapist's failure to adequately test or diagnose pa-
tients.10' This negligence may indirectly result in injury. 0 2 For in-
stance, liability may be predicated on a negligently conducted
examination which leads to the prescription of unnecessary medi-
cations that injure the patient. Additionally, negligent diagnosis
may result from failure to perform an adequate examination; fail-
ure to understand the nature, limitations, and proper uses of tests;
failure to draw conclusions reasonably arising from the examina-
tion; failure to properly administer tests; or failure to observe ethi-
cal limitations regarding tests."'
6. Sexual contact and excessive force. Liability may result
from taking unfair advantage of a patient or from using excessive
force. Unfair advantage is an ethical violation and commonly in-
volves sexual contact between patient and professional. 104 One of
101. See Slawson & Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 979 (survey of 217 malpractice
actions against psychiatrists from 1974 to 1978 indicates diagnostic errors were the major
cause of liability); Wright, supra note 80, at 1485-93 (analyzing causes of action resulting in
claims against insurance companies due to psychologists' malpractice); see Kahn & Taft,
The Application of the Standard of Care Doctrine to Psychological Testing, 1 BmtAv. SCL
& L 71, 74 (1983) (discussing standards for administration of commonly used tests).
102. Not every negligent diagnosis will result in liability. For example, most states
provide some immunity for negligent diagnosis that results in wrongful civil commitment, so
long as the professional acts in good faith or is not reckless.
103. See, e.g., Szimonisz v. United States, 537 F. Supp 147, 148 (D. Or. 1932) (finding
liability for failure to diagnose growing tumor during patient's numerous stays at hospital);
Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788, 792 (1970) (two pediatricians indepen-
dently treating plaintiff failed to admini ter tests for diagnosis of phenylketenuria); Welch
v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp., 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761, 763 (1939) (psychiatrist, failing to diag-
nose thyroid problem, treated patient for depression for six months). See generally Busch &
Cavanaugh, Physical Examination of Psychiatric Outpatients: Medical and Legal Issues,
36 Hosp. & CommuNITY PSYcHIATRY 958, 959-60 (1985) (although psychiatric patients tend
to be less healthy than the general population and examination of outpatients is important,
psychiatrists rarely perform such examinations and only a small percentage intitiate them);
Modlin & Felthous, Forensic Psychiatry in Private Practice, 17 BuLL Am AcAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY 69 (1989) (suggesting that forensic psychiatrists need to be expert diagnosticians); Note,
Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalization: Toward a Common
Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 1153, 1161-67 (1989) (discus-
ing the obligation of care and careful diagnosis in the release of patients).
104. See AnsmcAN PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N ETHICAL PMCwLES OF PSYCHOLOGISS
(1981) (principles 6, 7); NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOC. WORKERS. CODE OF ETICS. § ILF.5 (1979).
See also Pope, Keith-Spiegel & Tabachnik, supra note 38, at 151-52 (noting that sexual
attraction between therapist and patient is not uncommon). Sexual contact is often harmful
to the patient. Bouhoutsos, Holroyd, Lerman, Forer & Greenberg, Sexual Intimacy Between
Psychotherapists and Patients, 14 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RS. & PRAC. 185 (1983); Feldman-
Summers & Jones, Psychological Impacts of Sexual Contact Between Therapists or Other
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the most notorious cases, Zipkin v. Freeman,10 5 involved a patient
who was referred to a psychiatrist after a physician could discover
no physical cause for her ailments.108 At the psychiatrist's sugges-
tion, she went on overnight trips with him and attended "group
therapy" in the form of nude swimming parties.107 The psychiatrist
also advised her to leave her husband, sue her husband and
brother, and rid herself of hostility by breaking into her husband's
home. 108 The court found the psychiatrist liable for the injuries the
patient sustained as a result of the psychiatrist's misconduct.109
This case undoubtedly represents an extreme example of the
mishandling of the transference phenomenon.110 Other courts, in
less outrageous cases, have recognized that the nature of the thera-
pist-patient relationship and the patient's great dependence on the
therapist make it easy for the therapist to take advantage of the
patient."11 The therapist who does so is acting unethically and is
subject to liability.1 1 2 Indeed, sexual involvement with patients is
Health Care Practitioners and Their Clients, 52 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHoL00Y
1054, 1054 (1984).
105. 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
106. Id. at 756.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 758-59.
109. Id. at 762.
110. Transference, a common phenomenon in psychotherapy, is the process by which a
patient's emotional feelings are transferred to the therapist from the true object of the pa-
tient's feelings. During this period, the patient often "falls in love" with the therapist for a
time. See generally Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (dis-
cussing the meaning of transference and judicial treatment of it in the context of
malpractice).
111. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 315 (1968) (during
the period that psychiatrist provided marital counseling to couple, he seduced the wife);
Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1983) (patient discovered his wife
in bed with his psychiatrist after the patient disclosed their separation during a therapy
session); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (psychia.
trist induced patient to have sexual intercourse as part of her prescribed therapy). Institu-
tions may also face liability claims as a result of therapist-patient sex. Doe v. Samaritan
Counseling Center, 791 P.2d 344, 346-49 (Alaska 1990); see also Epstein, The Exploitative
Psychotherapist as a Defendant, 25 TRIAL 53, 55 (1989) (asserting that if therapist has sex
with one patient, he is likely to have sex with others); Stone, The Legal Implications of
Sexual Activity Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 133 AhL J. PSYCHIATRY 1138, 1138 (1976)
(arguing that because legal and professional sanctions against therapists who have had sex
with their patients are either rare or extremely complicated, in the end, patients must de-
pend on the decent moral character of their therapist).
112. A therapist may also be liable for alienation of affection when the therapist has
been sexually involved with a married patient. In states still recognizing this cause of action,
a spouse of a patient who has been enticed out of a marital relationship by a therapist may
file suit. See, e.g., Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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among the most significant malpractice risks of the 1990s.
A few mental health professionals have suggested that, in spe-
cific instances, sexual contact between patients and therapists is
proper or even desirable because it may provide the acceptance or
affection a patient needs.113 Although this position is rejected by
most mental health professionals, it does represent a small "school
of thought;" a troubling question is whether liability should be im-
posed on therapists who adhere to this school and engage in "ther-
apeutic" sexual contact with patients.' Because this school of
thought is rejected by much of the profession as being dangerous
to the patient, such conduct is likely to be considered negligent
(akin to curing cancer with copper bracelets) or, at best, experi-
mental. Therefore, the therapist who engages in sexual relations
with a patient is subject to liability if that conduct results in injury
to the patient.1 5 A patient probably cannot freely consent to en-
App. 1972) (psychiatrist's designs to wed married patient constituted breach of contract to
provide professional care). See generally J. SimH, supra note 7, at 286-338. A therapist may
also be liable to the patient for sexual contact with a spouse or lover of a patient. Eg., Rowe
v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me. 1986); Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress in
the Psychotherapist-Patient Relationship: A Case Analysis of Rowe v. Bennett, 11 HAi-
LInE L. Rxv. 123 (1988).
113. See SHEPARD, THE LovE TEERi .NT- SEXUAL ImmcY BmTxxN PAT rS m
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 15 (1971); see also Marmor, Sexual Acting-Out in Psychotherapy, 32
AM. J. PSYCHOANALysis 3 (1972) (discussing various rationalizations for therapist-patient sex-
ual contact and concluding that it is detrimental to the therapeutic process).
114. The ethical standards of physicians and the mental health prof-sions clearly
prohibit sexual contact with patients. However, surveys repeatedly note that it is unusual
for therapists to have sexual relations with present or former patients. About 90% of ther-
apists report having been sexually attracted to patients, but less than 10% report having
engaged in such behavior. See Pope, Keith-Spiegel & Tabachnick, supra note 48, at 147;
Pope, Tabachnick & Keith-Spiegel, Ethics of Practice: The Beliefs and Behauiors of Psy-
chologists as Therapists, 42 AL. PSYCHOLOGIST 993, 999 (1987); J. Ro5 rsoN, supra note 7,
at 326-27.
115. E.g., Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770
P.2d 278, 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989) (en banc) (holding therapist liable to both mothers
and sons for molestation of the children because both suffered direct injury and severe emo-
tional distress); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(patient so emotionally and mentally injured due to sex with therapist that she required
hospitalization); see also Benetin & Wilder, Sexual Exploitation and Psychotherapy, 11
Wo oN's RTs. L REP. 121, 121-22 (1989) (emphasizing that harm to patient goe3 much
deeper than tort or contract injury); Cope, Psychotherapists Liable for Sexual Relations
With Patients, 25 TRiA. 135, 136 (1989) (discussing case in which therapist got patient
addicted to barbiturates and valium, then used her addiction to force her to have sex with
him over a 14-year period); Gutheil, Borderline Personality Disorder, Boundary Violations,
and Patient-Therapist Sex: Medicolegal Pitfalls, 146 ALL J. PSYCHtATRY 597, 597 (1989)
(discussing the legal pitfalls therapists face when they become sexually involved); Note, Psy-
chiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HIARv. WouN''s LJ. 83,84 (1988)
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
gage in therapist-patient sexual relations because of the nature of
the relationship between patient and the therapist and the pa-
tient's emotional dependence on the therapist. 6
Liability also may arise from the use of therapy that includes
very painful or violent physical contact.11  Hammer v. Rosen," 8 a
notable excessive force case, involved a dramatic technique for
treating schizophrenia. This technique required that communica-
tion be established between physician and patient "on the pa-
tient's level." 1 9 For some patients, this included substantial slap-
ping and hitting as a means of opening up communication.20
Although therapists typically obtained consent from next of kin or
from a guardian, a patient ultimately sued for damages resulting
from the slaps and abuses during the beating, and the doctor was
subject to liability for injuries suffered as a result of this
treatment. 21
7. Breach of confidentiality. Mental health professionals
have ethical and legal obligations to maintain the secrets of their
(asserting that a woman who seeks psychiatric treatment and subsequently becomes in-
volved in sexual relations with her therapist is a victim of sex discrimination). But cf. Cole-
man, Sex Between Psychiatrist and Former Patient: A Proposal for a "No Harm, No Foul"
Rule, 41 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1988) (suggesting that civil, rather than criminal sanctions are
appropriate when a therapist has sex with a former patient).
116. See Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 352, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (Civ. Ct. 1975) (a
suit arising from a therapist's sexual relations with a patient is treated as a conventional
action for seduction); Cummings & Sobel, Malpractice Insurance: Update on Sex Claims,
22 PSYcHoTHFAPY 186, 187 (1985) (sexual intimacy malpractice suit involves violation of a
trust by the therapist to the patient); Morin, Civil Remedies for Therapist-Patient Sexual
Exploitation, 19 GOLDEN GATE U.L. Rnv. 401, 417 (1989) (contending that patient's consent
to therapy does not carry over to sexual acts, which are not considered proper therapy).
For a general discussion of possible criminal liability for therapist-patient sexual activ-
ity, see COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (1989); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344 (West 1989); N. D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West Supp. 1989); Appelbaum,
Statutes Regulating Patient-Therapist Sex, 41 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHITRY 15, 15-16
(1990); Leroy, The Potential Criminal Liability of Human Sex Clinics and Their Patients,
16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 586, 593-99 (1972); Stone, The Legal Implications of Sexual Activities
Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 133 Am. J: PSYCHIATRY 1138, 1138-39 (1976).
117. Health care often involves some "violence" to the body, such as surgery, inocula-
tions and the like. Psychiatry is no exception; ECT can be considered quite invasive. There-
fore, the simple fact that painful physical contact occurred does not give rise to potential
liability. Rather, liability will likely arise from the use of some form of physical invasion
that is not widely accepted and is potentially harmful without offsetting p6tential benefits.
118. 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
119. Hammer, 165 N.E.2d at 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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patients.122 Failure to do so may result in liability for invasion of
privacy, 12  for negligence, 124 or conceivably, for breach of con-
tract. 25 The duty to protect confidentiality exists whether or not a
testimonial privilege covers the communication.12 0
The duty of confidentiality is not absolute.127 When compe-
tent, patients may waive confidentiality, for example, to release in-
formation needed for the therapist to receive payment for treat-
ment. 2 However, patients' limited waivers do not permit an
unlimited disclosure of the information by the therapist. For in-
stance, permission to inform an insurance company of therapy
122. For examples of ethical provisions concerning confidentiality, see Au=CAN Psy-
CHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHIcAL PRiNcPLEs OF PSYCHOLOGISTS (1981) (principle V); AiawiAN
PsYcHkTric AS'N, THE PmNciln.Es OF IMEDiCAL ETmIcs WTH ANNOTATioNS ESPECALLY Ap-
PUcABLE To PSYCHATRY § 4 (1981); NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOC. WORKERS, CODE OF EnmCS
(1979) (provision ILIL); AimmcAN PERsoNaNE, AND GumANce Ass'N. ETHIcAL STANDARDS §§
2, 5, 6, 7, 8 (1981). The relevant portions of these codes are reprinted in S, SmrrH & R.
MEYER, supra note 29, at 77-80.
123. The most likely form of privacy liability for revealing patient information is
"false light." False light is publication of a misleading communication in a manner that
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. REsTATEEw (SECoND) oF TORMs § 652D.
124. Therapists have a duty to maintain confidentiality. A reasonably prudent thera-
pist would not reveal patient information (with certain exceptions) without patient consent.
Therefore, unauthorized release of information is unreasonable and negligent. Refer to note
125 infra.
125. Some therapists expressly agree to maintain patient secrets. A therapist who vio-
lates this promise may be held liable for a breach of contract. Courts might also find an
implied term in a treatment contract that the therapist would act ethically. The unautho-
rized release of information from therapy may be unethical conduct. For an excellent review
of therapist liability for breach of confidentiality, see Eger, Psychotherapists' Liability for
Extrajudicial Breaches of Confidentiality, 18 ARiz. L. Rav. 1061, 1065 (1976) (discussing
the various theories of recovery available to a patient who has been harmed by a breach of
confidentiality). See also Note, Roe v. Doe: A Remedy for Disclosure of Psychiatric Confi-
dences, 29 RuTGERs L. Iv. 190, 192 (1975) (discussing the contract, tort and constitutional
issues raised by a therapist's breach of confidientiality); cf. Cooper, The Physician's Di-
lemma: Protection of the Right to Privacy, 22 ST. Louis ULJ. 397, 397-99 (1978) (discuss-
ing medical information generally).
126. The obligation of confidentiality exists independently of the privilege. In the ab-
sence of a privilege, a court may order a therapist to release information, but the general
duty to maintain the secrets of the client remains. Refer to note 125 supra. The therapist
who wrongfully reveals information in documents related to a judicial proceeding may be
subject to liability as well as discipline. Mississippi Bd. of Psychological Examiners v. Ho3-
ford, 508 So.2d 1049, 1053 (Miss. 1987) (psychologist was suspended from practice and sat-
fled a civil action for $9000 after filing an affidavit about a patient in a divorce and custody
case).
127. See Smith, supra note 44, at 513.
128. The patient "owns" the confidentiality and is free to waive the right. See id. at
541-42 (observing that patients commonly waive medical and psychotherapy confidentiality
to ensure the payment of insurance claims).
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
does not include the right of the professional to write a book
describing the patient and the therapy. 12 9 In some cases, therapists
are obligated to breach confidentiality. For example, when ther-
apists receive information concerning child abuse or a valid court
order requiring release of information,"" they may release such in-
formation without incurring liability.
8. Referral to other practitioners. Some clients present
problems that a particular mental health professional cannot ade-
quately address. For example, the patient may require sophisti-
cated psychological testing that a psychiatrist does not feel compe-
tent to complete, or a patient being seen by a psychologist may
need medical intervention. In such circumstances, the professional
must refer the patient to another professional. If a therapist negli-
gently fails to refer the patient, the therapist will be subject to lia-
bility. 31 This is consistent with ethical standards requiring that
professionals not practice beyond their competence.3 2
When referral is necessary because of personal feelings or con-
flicts with patients, the professional must make arrangements for
the patient to be transferred to another therapist. The therapist
must not "dump" or suddenly stop seeing a patient. After treat-
ment has begun, the professional's failure to attend to the patient
or to make reasonable provision for the patient to see another com-
petent professional may constitute "abandonment." 3
9. Involuntary civil commitment and detention. Participa-
tion in the civil commitment process may subject mental health
129. See generally Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (1977) (invali-
dating patient's oral waiver of confidentiality obtained during the course of treatment).
130. See Smith & Meyer, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Psychotherapy: A Time
for Reconsideration, 7 INT'L J.L. & PsYCHATRY 351, 352-53 (1984).
131. See Morreim, Conflicts of Interest: Profits and Problems in Physician Referrals,
262 J. A.MA 390 (1989). Referring a patient to another practitioner may also result in lia-
bility if the selection of the practitioner is negligent and the selected practitioner harms the
patient. See e.g., Cestone v. Harkavy, 243 A.D. 732, 277 N.Y.S. 438, 439 (1935).
132. In mental health cases, it is often very difficult to determine when referral is
required. The law defines the duty according to a reasonable practitioner standard: Would a
reasonable practitioner with similar training and experience have made the referral? The
desire to keep a client for economic reasons is not a legitimate reason not to refer. See
PROSSER & KaTON ON TORTS, supra note 35, § 32, at 187.
133. See B. SCHuLTz, LEGAL LAnrY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 50-5 (1982); J. SMITH, supra
note 7, at 47; Shapiro, Medical Malpractice: History, Diagnosis and Prognosis, 22 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 469, 481 (1978); Weddington & Cavenar, Termination Initiated by the Therapist: A
Countertransference Storm, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1302 (1979).
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professionals to liability. Although most states provide immunity
so long as the professional acts in good faith, 3' significant miscon-
duct may result in liability.135 If the professional is not acting in
good faith, efforts to detain or commit a patient involuntarily may
result in liability for false imprisonment or for malicious prosecu-
tion.1 6 In such circumstances, punitive damages are possible. 13 7
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,'" the United States Supreme
Court addressed the applicability of section 1983 to the involun-
tary civil commitment process.113 In that case, Donaldson claimed
that, although he was not dangerous, he had been involuntarily
held without treatment.1 4 0 The trial court awarded him $38,500 in
damages from the state officials and psychiatrists involved in his
lengthy confinement.141 The Supreme Court held that a state can-
not legally confine nondangerous individuals capable of surviving
134. When psychotherapists testify in involuntary civil commitment hearings, their in
court statements usually are protected by a "privilege" from successful defamation suits.
See PROSSER & KEEroN ON TORTS, supra note 35, § 114, at 816-17. Other work done for
courts, or as part of the civil commitment process, will generally be exempt from defamation
suits as long as therapists have acted in good faith. See id. § 114, at 818.
135. See, e.g., Lanier v. Sallas, 777 F.2d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding a $0,000
award to a person committed on the basis of false affidavits by doctors who never examined
her); see also Kleber v. Stevens, 39 Misc. 2d 712, 241 N.Y.S.2d 497, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(indicating that physician examining an allegedly mentally ill person has a duty to exercise
ordinary care), ajf'd, 20 A.D.2d 896, 249 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1964); Knapp & VandeCreek, A Re-
view of Tort Liability in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 38 Hosp. & Cowszmw PSYCUA-
TRY 648, 648-49 (1987) (discussing general bases of liability). But see Rhiver v. Rietman, 148
Ind. App., 265 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Ct. App. 1970) (indicating that physician may be held liable
for performing test in a negligent manner).
In this section we consider liability for wrongfully committing a patient. Liability may
also exist for negligently releasing a committed patient. Refer to note 211 infra and accom-
panying test.
136. As a practical matter, to sustain a malicious prosecution suit, the patient usually
must demonstrate that the therapist acted in an outrageous fashion, either conspiring with
others to commit the patient for ulterior motives, or attempting to detain the patient for the
personal gain of the physician or out of hatred for the patient. See, eg., Maben v. Rankin,
55 Cal. 2d 139, 358 P.2d 681, 682, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 34 (1961); Whitree v. State, 586 Misc.
2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486, 505 (Ct. CL 1968) (awarding $300,000 damages to plaintiff who
was wrongfully confined in a state hospital for 12 years); Note, Tort Liability of the Psycho-
therapist, 8 U.SF. L. R. 405, 415-16 (1973) (discussing the difficulty of proving lack of
probable cause and malice).
137. See PROSSER & KEETON ON ToRTs, supra note 35, § 2, at 11.
138. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
139. Id. at 565. Section 1983 imposes liability on those who deprive others of the civil
rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
140. O'Conner, 422 U.S. at 565.
141. Id. at 572.
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safely in freedom unless it provides some form of treatment.14 The
Court did not decide whether a state may detain a dangerous per-
son without treatment or whether a state may detain a
nondangerous person if it provides treatment. According to the
Court, although officials have "no duty to anticipate unforeseeable
constitutional developments," persons held in violation of this con-
stitutional rule could receive damages in the future.143 However, in
Youngberg v. Romeo, 44 the Court also has made it clear that pro-
fessionals will not be individually liable for the state's failure to
provide adequate funds and facilities for involuntary patients. 45
More recently, in Zinermon v. Burch,146 the Court suggested that
section 1983 liability may arise in an apparently "voluntary" ad-
mission to a mental hospital if a clearly incompetent patient is
held in a hospital under his own "consent. ' 147 In that situation, the
consent is legally ineffective and the decision to hold the patient
without a judicial proceeding (e.g., civil commitment or guardian-
ship) may deprive him of freedom without due process.1 48 Of
course, the mistreatment of patients (e.g., beatings or unreasonable
restraint) or the unreasonable withholding of available treatment
also may subject the professional to common-law or section 1983
liability. 49
10. Test construction and validation. Mental health profes-
sionals have become increasingly involved in the development and
validation of many forms of tests, particularly employment and ed-
142. Id. at 576.
143. Id. at 577.
144. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
145. Id. at 323.
146. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
147. Id. at 987.
148. Id. at 987-88.
149. Severe beatings or treatment inflicted on a civil commitment patient constitute a
violation of due process; if it were to occur to a prisoner, the cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition of the eighth amendment would apply. The same activity directed towards a
voluntary patient constitutes common law battery. See Belger v. Arnot, 344 Mass. 679, 183
N.E.2d 866, 869 (1962) (indicating that three attendants may have committed battery when
they "grabbed" a patient and escorted her to a hospital ward); Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386
Mich. 119, 191 N.W.2d 355, 365 (1971) (holding psychiatrist liable for assault and battery
for ordering that certain shots and medication be given to a patient who refused treatment);
Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1960) (hold.
ing that evidence indicating that psychiatrist beat patient established prima facie case of
malpractice).
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ucation tests.150 Defective test design or defective validation may
result in a test that does not do what it purports to do or that is
illegally discriminatory. This may harm those relying on the test
(e.g., an employer) as well as the test takers (e.g., a prospective
employee). Traditionally, such defects did not result in significant
liability partly because the doctrine of "limited duty" made it diffi-
cult for test takers to recover.15 Mental health professionals can-
not assume that this tradition will continue. In Cleveland, Ohio, a
recent claim against a test developer was settled for a substantial
amount in a case in which a psychologist developed a city employ-
ment test that had disparate impact on women. 1 2 The Title VII
settlement went to those who had been disadvantaged by the test,
not to the city organization that had paid to have the test
developed.15 3
11. Nontraditional therapy. In recent years, therapists have
developed a number of nontraditional and "pop" therapies.2
Some of these claim to solve serious emotional problems and,
150. See, e.g., S. Smr & R MEYER, supra note 29, at 173-88 (observing that the
mental health professionals have become valuable in assisting courts with assessing the con-
stitutional and statutory validity of educational and employment tests); ef. Bersoff, Testing
and the Law, 36 ALL PSYCHOLOGIST 1047, 1047-48 (1981) (noting three benefits of increased
legal involvement in psychological testing. (1) it makes society more aware of racial and
cultural biases; (2) psychologists will be held responsible for their conduct, and (3) it will
accelerate the search for better methods).
151. The limited duty rule prevents liability for negligent conduct by allowing for a
determination that the defendant did not owe a duty to the injured plaintiff in certain cir-
cumstances. PRossM & KEETON ON ToRTs, supra note 35, § 53 at 356-59.
152. Zailen v. Cleveland, 686 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (concerning a test for
prospective firefighters that discriminated against women applicants), afl'd, 906 F.2d 209
(6th Cir. 1990).
153. Personal conversation with Professor Jane Picker, Cleveland State University
College of Law, an attorney representing the plaintiff in the litigation. The suit was settled
with regard to the psychologist, but was dismissed with regard to the governmental entity.
Zamlen, 686 F. Supp. at 634.
154. See, e.g., . RosEN, PSYCHOnAnnI (1977) (discussing the therapeutic trends of the
1970s including EST, rebirthing, co-counseling, and primal therapy); Glass, Kirsh & Parris,
Psychiatric Disturbances Associated with Erhard Seminars Training: A Report of Cases,
134 Ah. J. PSYCHIATRY 245 (1977) (discussing five cases of psychiatric disturbance following
EST participation); M. GROSS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SocmET 277-317 (1978) (comparing pri-
mal therapy to Freudian therapy); Keen, Deliver Us From Shyness Clinics, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Mar. 1978, at 18 (criticizing new therapies that promise to wipe out human emotions
such as shyness); Shastrom, Group Therapy: Let The Buyer Beware, in CLNCAL PsYcHoL-
OGY TODAY 149 (B. Henker ed. 1967); Yalom & Lieberman, A Study of Encounter Group
Casualties, 25 ARcHnvs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 16 (1971) (discussing 16 "casualties" of group
therapy who experienced enduring, significant, and negative outcomes to therapy).
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therefore, attract emotionally disturbed people.155 The training
available to or taken by the practitioners of these various forms of
therapy varies widely. As a general matter, state licenses are not
required in order to "practice" nontraditional therapies.15
A number of unsettled questions remain in this area. To what
extent should the practitioners of "pop" therapies be held liable
when the counseling results in injury (e.g., suicide)? 57 Should
practitioners of nontraditional therapies be held to the standard of
care of psychotherapists generally, or to a special standard of care
defined by their own nontraditional therapy? Some commentators
argue that, in order to protect patients from ineffective therapy
and charlatans, practitioners of nontraditional therapies should be
held to the same standard of care and charged with the same
knowledge as more traditional psychotherapists.15 8 According to
the commentators, the application of a lesser standard would per-
mit the absence of substantial training to be an advantage to avoid
liability and would indirectly encourage the development of poten-
tially harmful "pop" therapies.159 On the other side, it is claimed
that applying the standard of care of ordinary psychotherapy to
nontraditional forms is unfair and will discourage the development
of new, potentially effective, therapies.1 60
The law generally has defined a standard of care in terms of
the "schools of thought" of the practitioner involved.1 61 This prin-
ciple suggests that practitioners of nontraditional therapy should
be held to their own standard of care. However, those who "hold
themselves out" as having special qualifications are expected to
practice at a level consistent with those qualifications.1 62 For in-
stance, general practitioners who claim to be cardiologists should
be held to that higher standard of care. These principles also
should apply to the practitioners of "pop" therapies who present
155. Keen, supra note 154, at 18-19.
156. S. SMiTH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 128-33, 137-41.
157. 3 M. PnRLI, MEAL DisABmrry LAW: CIVIL AND CmMINAL 66-69 (1989).
158. See, e.g., Note, Standard of Care in Administering Non-Traditional Psychother-
apy, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. Rnv. 56, 82-3 (1974) (calling for legislative action to protect the public).
159. Id. at 83.
160. See Hogan, Encounter Groups and Human Relations Training: The Case
Against Applying Traditional Forms of Statuatory Regulation, 11 HARv. J. LEGIS. 659, 683-
99 (1974) (taking the view that human relations training is a social invention like the family
that tries to teach skills for living in modem society and should not be regulated).
161. See PROSSER & KEEroN oN ToRS, supra note 35, § 32, at 185-93 (defining the
standard of care for specialists).
162. Id. § 32, at 185-188.
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themselves to the public as therapists or trained counselors. 103
There is a strong argument that those practicing nontradi-
tional forms of therapy should have a duty to recognize and refer
to other professionals those clients who are suicidal and those with
serious emotional problems who may be harmed by the nontradi-
tional therapy.1 Consider, for example, a "growth" group that
uses highly emotional and aggressive techniques and does not
screen applicants to eliminate those likely to be harmed by the ses-
sions. If a participant commits suicide as a result of the emotional
pressure and aggression generated by the session, liability is justi-
fied. By claiming to be counselors or therapists, the therapists hold
themselves out as having sufficient training and skills to identify
those with serious emotional problems.
A related issue arises when ministers, who may lack adequate
training in pastoral counseling or psychotherapy, counsel seriously
disturbed patients.0 5 Ministers often combine therapy with reli-
gious counseling.16 Thus, first amendment concerns arise because
imposing liability for religious counseling may interfere with the
163. B. SCHULTZ. LEGAL LIABILITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 3-4 (1982); Knapp, A Primer on
Malpractice for Psychologists, 11 PROF. PSYCHOLOGIST. RES. & PRAC. 606, 607 (1980). But cf.
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 299, 763 P.2d 948, 960-61,
253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 109-10 (1988) (holding that pastoral councelors have no duty to refer
suicidal person to a psychotherapist).
164. Organizations that hold encounter group sessions without providing adequate su-
pervision by professionals may be subject to liability because of the severe psychological
harm that may result from such intense experiences. Bingham v. Lifespring, No. 82-5128
(ED. Pa. July 31,1984), reported in 28 ATLA L. REP. 139 (1985); Cf. Suskind v. Lifespring,
No. 83-4370 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1984) (significant settlement prior to trial), reported in 28
ATLA L, REP. 139 (1985). But see Note, Nontherapist Counselors: No Duty to Refer Sui-
cidal Patients to Licensed Psychotherapists, 13 L. & PSYCHOLOGY Rzv. 91 (1989) (discussing
the duty to refer, and agreeing with the court's analysis in Nally). Refer to notes 164-78
infra and accompanying text.
165. See generally Griffith, Adams & Young, Further Clarification of Clergy Malprac-
tice, 39 Hosp. & CommuNrr PSYcHATRY 1041 (1988) (discussing the Nally case and the
question of whether pastoral counseling is religious or secular); Griffith & Young, Pastoral
Counseling and the Concept of Malpractice, 15 BuLL. Am Acw. PSYCHATRY & L. 257
(1987) (discussing the evolution of pastoral counseling and the Nally case); Young & Grif-
fith, The Development and Practice of Pastoral Counseling, 40 Hosp. & CosmuNrr Psy-
CHIATRY 271, 274 (1989) (discussing the history of pastoral counseling and a typology of
three major thrusts: religious counseling, pastoral mental health work, and pastoral psycho-
therapy); Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in
Disguise?, 17 U. ToL L. Rv. 209, 210 (1985) (noting that the duty on clergy counselors is no
greater than the ethical duty imposed by his own conscienco and calling for more liability).
166. See Young & Griffith, supra note 165, at 271, 274 (describing pastoral mental
health work as combining faith and mental health).
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free exercise of religion.1 17 The law should be reluctant to impose
liability for religious malpractice since courts may have great diffi-
culty determining where religious counseling ends and mental
health therapy begins.6 8 However, if ministers claim to be provid-
ing mental health services, they should at least be responsible for
determining when patients are suicidal or otherwise at serious risk.
In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 69 the
California Supreme Court considered the question of whether a
pastoral counselor could be liable for the negligent failure to diag-
nose and refer a suicidal client to a professional psychotherapist. 1 0
The court held that the pastoral counselors did not have a duty to
refer a suicidal person to psychotherapists .2 1  The court empha-
sized that pastoral counselors deal with a variety of problems, but
are not "professional, medical or psychiatric counselors.' 1 2 There-
fore, they did not have a "special relationship" with the plaintiff
that would have created a duty to prevent the suicide.173
The specific facts in Natly suggested that there was little need
for referral; the plaintiff had seen five doctors and a psychiatrist
and had been in a mental hospital for months before his suicide.1 4
Furthermore, the court noted that the church had no "professional
or clinical counseling ministry" and that its pastoral counseling
"was essentially religious in nature."'1 5 Nevertheless, the court's
holding went well beyond the facts of this case to suggest that lia-
bility should not "be extended to a nontherapist counselor who of-
fers counseling to a potentially suicidal person on secular or spiri-
tual matters." 76 In a footnote, however, the court noted that there
167. Id. at 275 (noting that establishing a standard of care for pastoral counselors
might create first amendment problems).
168. Id. (noting that the California Supreme Court in Nalley sugge3ted that the state
was not qualified to evaluate the quality of a religious counselor's work).
169. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988).
170. Id. In addition to the negligence action, the case also contained a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress that the court also dismissed. At least one commenta-
tor has concluded that this intentional tort cause of action has some promise. See Crane,
Clergy Malpractice After Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 12 An. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 381, 387-91 (1988) (noting that clergy have been held liable on theories of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, alienation of affection, defamation, and breach of fiduciary
relationship).
171. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 299, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 299, 763 P.2d at 961, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
174. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 951, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
175. Id. at 283, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
176. Id. at 299-300, 763 P.2d at 961, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
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may be liability on "nontherapist counselors who hold themselves
out as professionals" if their patients are injured.1 " The very fact
that someone is called a "pastoral counselor" (rather than a "pas-
tor") could lead many to believe that he is a professional with
mental health skills.75
12. Providing treatment without consent. Informed consent
issues appear repeatedly in discussions of malpractice claims.17 In
reality, however, failure of informed consent is probably not a sig-
nificant source of liability unless there is also a physical injury and
some form of misconduct (such as misrepresentation)180 or negli-
gence in providing the treatment.181 For example, where a patient
suffered a compression fracture of the spine as a result of ECT, but
had not been informed prior to treatment of the risk of that injury,
the court properly granted recovery based on a failure of informed
consent.18 2
Other forms of treatment, such as aversive therapies, that in-
volve substantial physical contact or manipulation ordinarily re-
177. Id.; see also Troyer, Protecting the Flock from the Shepherd: A Duty of Care
and Licensing Requirements for Clergy Counselors, 30 B.C.L. REv. 1179, 1207 (1989) [here-
inafter Protecting the Flock] (discussing the need for imposing liability on clergy counselors
in order to protect the public); Nontherapist Counselors-No Duty to Refer Suicidal Pa-
tients to Licensed Psychotherapists, supra note 164, at 102 (discussing the footnote in
Nally in which the court states that it may hold certain counselors liable).
178. See Protecting of the Flock, supra note 177, at 1207-20 (discussing how licensing
would keep the public from being misled).
179. The failure of informed consent is, admittedly, more of a cause of action than an
area of practice. However, it cuts across so many areas of practice that it merits separate
consideration. For a table illustrating potential liability for various areas of mental health
practice, refer to Appendix infra.
180. Any misrepresentation would destroy the voluntary assent that is critical to valid
informed consent. See J. SmrrH, supra note 7, at 175-77.
181. The need to prove that injury resulted from the mental health professional's fail-
ure to give adequate information, and that clear damages resulted from the lack of informed
consent often make recovery difficult in informed consent cases. See id. In the past, when
many valid medical malpractice claims were hard to pursue because expert witn'e3 for
plaintiffs were not generally available, informed consent probably helped keep alive some
cases that otherwise might have been dismissed. See id.; cf. R. FAD N & T. BEAuc&%H. A
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORED CONSENT 34-35 (1986) (noting that the plaintiff can show
the required causal connection between failure to disclose and injury, if the patient would
have still consented with a disclosure on a reasonable person standard).
182. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962). The psychiatrist should
also warn of dangers and discuss alternatives. See, eg., Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11,
19 (Mo. 1960) (holding that doctor has a duty to inform patient of known hazards of insulin
injections to treat emotional illness).
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quire informed consent.' Prescription drugs should also include
informed consent. Drug companies have an obligation to provide
information about prescription drugs to physicians who, in turn,
must inform their patients about the drugs.8 For example, a pa-
tient should be informed about potential serious side effects such
as tardive dyskinesia,5 5 changes in mood, and addiction. 8 There-
fore, psychiatrists who prescribe drugs should make reasonable ef-
forts to inform patients of how to use the drugs and the conse-
quences of using them.187
A patient who sees a psychotherapist has given implied con-
sent to usual therapy. 88 Some commentators argue that patients
have a right to know of certain risks that exist in nearly all ther-
apy, such as the limits of confidentiality.18 For example, because
183. The level of risk and pain affects the importance of informed consent. It could be
essential for some forms of aversive therapy. See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136,
1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973) (giving mental patient a drug to induce vomiting as punishment
requires knowing and intelligent consent); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 877-78 (9th
Cir. 1973) (recognizing a cause of action for a patient who consented to shock treatment but
not injection of "fright drug").
184. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-95 (8th Cir. 1969) (man-
ufacturer of drug must use reasonably effective method to inform doctor of dangerous side
effects of its drugs).
185. Tardive dyskinesia is an affliction characterized by involuntary movements of the
head (notably the mouth or tongue) or arms or legs. These symptoms appear with varying
intensity. Although the condition can occur after relatively short use of certain antipsy-
chotic drugs, it is more commonly associated with long-term use. In the minority of cases, it
is irreversible. More commonly, the condition subsides if the drug is discontinued. Washing-
ton v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1077 (1990).
186. Under limited circumstances, courts may presume that a patient consented to
invasive procedures such as ECT if he fails to object to it. E.g., Wilson v. Lehman, 379
S.W.2d 478, 479-80 (Ky. 1964) (finding that submitting to 11 shock treatments without any
objection is evidence of consent). However, it would be a mistake to conclude that every
patient who does not object to ECT has given informed consent to the procedure.
187. See generally Appleton, Legal Problems in Psychiatric Drug Prescription, 124
A?. J. PSYCHIATRY 877, 879-80 (1968) (concluding that a physician who does not warn a
patient of potential drug toxicity must be prepared to justify the lack of warning); Merrill,
Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1973) (asserting that
the goal of fully informed patient participation in the selection and use of prescription drugs
is illusory); Wettstein, Tardive Dyskinesia and Malpractice, 1 BEHAV. SCL & L. 85, 99-102
(1983) (arguing against a return to written informed consent forms in favor of reminding the
patient of possible risks as often as necessary).
188. Refer to note 56 supra and accompanying text. Consent to ordinary touching and
the very minor invasions of treatment can be implied from the fact that the patient seeks
therapy. Once something out of the usual or more invasive is undertaken, the practitioner
should seek specific consent. This consent may be oral but many attorneys suggest written
consent because it is easier to prove consent with a written document.
189. See, e.g., Hare-Mustin, Marecek, Kaplan & Liss-Levinson, Rights of Clients, Re-
sponsibilities of Therapists, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 3, 7-10 (1979) (advocating the use of a
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most patients presume that whatever they tell a therapist will re-
main confidential, a practitioner should perhaps inform them that
some communications will not necessarily remain secret.1"0 It is
unlikely that significant liability exists for the failure of informed
consent in most "talk therapy."9 1 However, some forms of behav-
ior modification should include informed consent if they involve
treatment that patients will find uncomfortable, for example tak-
ing an acrophobic patient to an open, tall building. Such treat-
ments are certain to inflict significant emotional distress and there-
fore should be accompanied by informed consent. 1 2
In practice, mental health professionals frequently ignore the
doctrine of informed consent.11 3 Many factors may interfere with
.contract to clarify the therapeutic relationship); Noll, The Psychotherapist and Informed
Consent, 133 AL. J. PSYCHIATRY 1451, 1452 (1976) (discussing psychotherapists responibil-
ity to inform patients of the potential limits of confidentiality for patients seeking therapy
under the provisions of a health insurance policy); Smith, supra note 43, at 29; Smith, Un-
finished Business With Informed Consent Procedures, 36 A. PsYcHoLoows? 22, 24-25
(1981) (advocating amendment of psychological standards to require informed consent
before a client is diagnostically labeled or coded).
190. See, e.g., Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 32 AL. PsYcHoLoGLsT 638,
643 (1977) (discussing the lack of certainty regarding the confidentiality of communications
made in group therapy).
191. See S. SmTrH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 625-26. An interesting debate be-
tween distinguished psychiatrists developed over whether it would be malpractice, without
special informed consent, for a depressed patient to be treated with long-term traditional
psychotherapy rather than biological treatments that have been shown to be effective. Com-
pare Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient's Right to Effective Treatment- Implications of
Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 147 Au. J. PSYCHIATRY 409, 413-15 (1990) (suggesting psycho-
therapists may be liable for malpractice when they fail to use drugs and other biological
treatments in the treatment of severe depression) with Stone, Law, Science, and Psychiatric
Malpractice: A Response to Klerman's Indictment of Psychoanalytic Psychiatry, 147 Aa. J.
PSYCHIATRY 419, 424-26 (1990) (arguing that psychotherapists should be able to consider all
forms of therapy, including traditional psychotherapy, without the threat of malpractice).
The case that gave rise to this discussion was reported on a procedural basis without reach-
ing the substance of the debate. Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. App. 519, 525, 490
A.2d 720, 723 (Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 304 Md. 163, 163, 497 A.2d 1163, 1163 (1985).
The parties eventually settled. Stone, supra, at 419. See also J. MALcoLtL supra note 51, at
5-7 (examining the psychodynamic/biological treatment debate).
Liability should flow from the failure to inform a patient that he or she may not be
offered the most effective treatment for a condition and to permit the patient to request the
more effective treatment. The debate surrounding Osheroff, however, demonstrates how dif-
ficult it can be to define what is inappropriate in any given case even among distinguished
mental health professionals of the same discipline.
192. Cf. PROSSER & KErTON ON ToRTs, supra note 35, § 12 (discussing risk of liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress where there is no reasonable consent to
treatment).
193. See generally C. Lmz, A. Mzatsm R ZFRunAvm. M. CATRn R. Sr~TAx & L. Rom.
INFOmED CONSENT, A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING m PSYCHIATRY. 10-23 (1934) (reviewing in-
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the consent process: the limited mental competency of some pa-
tients, the failure to provide sufficient information in an under-
standable form, a feeling of paternalism toward patients, and the
patient's young age.194 There is evidence that in mental health
treatment, informed consent is often not very effective, either be-
cause professionals do not believe that patients are capable of par-
ticipating in the decision or because of a concern that patients will
not make decisions that are in their best interests.95 In other in-
stances, professionals go through the process in a very formal way
that does not convey much information to the patient, or the infor-
mation is presented in sophisticated medical jargon that the pa-
tient cannot understand.198 Written consent is desirable because it
provides a record of the transaction, for the therapist and the pa-
tient may take the process more seriously if there is a document to
be signed. 197 The ultimate purpose, however, is to provide the pa-
tient sufficient information for making an informed treatment
decision.
The competency of the patient is a critical issue in informed
consent. Obtaining informed consent from patients presupposes
that they are capable of making a reasoned decision, understand-
ing the alternatives available for treatment, and selecting the treat-
ment they desire.'98 Not all mental patients possess the capacity to
make decisions.'9 9 In Zinermon v. Burch, °° the Supreme Court
noted that consent by an incompetent patient is not legally effec-
tive and that such consent may not be the legal basis for holding a
patient in an institution.20' Patients who have been formally ad-
judged incompetent will have guardians appointed who can legally
provide consent.2 02 Other patients may have impairments that do
formed consent in an evaluation center, a research ward, and an outpatient clinic) [hereinaf-
ter INFORMED CONSENT].
194. Id. at 13, 303-06.
195. Id. at 316-18.
196. Id. at 13.
197. But see J. MALCOLM, supra note 51, at 75 (stating it is a mistake to equate the
signing of a consent form with actual informed consent).
198. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 193, at 20-22.
199. See Roth, Appelbaum, Sallee, Reynolds & Huber, The Dilemma of Denial in the
Assessment of Competency to Refuse Treatment, 139 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 910, 910-11 (1982)
(using a case analysis to illustrate the difficulty in assessing competency when the patient
denies illness).
200. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
201. Id. at 987.
202. Guardianship requires a formal process to determine that a person cannot make
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not justify a determination of incompetence, and in such cases,
professionals should take special steps to obtain informed con-
sent.203 Those steps might include special or repetitious discussions
(particularly if the patient has lucid moments) and, in some cir-
cumstances, informed consent from the next of kin. °"
Informed consent for children has traditionally been provided
by their parents.0 5 In recent years, children have been playing a
greater role in determining what treatment they will receive. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of
parents to make important mental health treatment decisions for
their children. In Parham v. J.R.,2 °0 the Court held that parents
may constitutionally "voluntarily" admit their children to mental
hospitals even over the objection of the children, subject to review
by a disinterested third party at the hospital.2 0 This involuntary
mental hospital admission for a minor involves a significant loss of
freedom. However, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of mi-
nors to make certain other important medical decisions (such as
abortion) without parental consent.20 The Court apparently sees
or communicate decisions for herself. See S. BpAI.L, J. PARRY & B. Wmm, T rTAu
DIsABLFD AND THE LAW, 378-81 (3d ed. 1985); S. HEFA S. ARONS & R. WALLACE, LEGAL
RIGHTS AND M mAL-HETH CARE 128 (1983). See generally S. JORDAN, DECSION MAK IG
FOR INCOMPETENT PERsoNs: THE LAW AND MoRALrry OF WHO SHAM DEcWE 105-06 (1985)
(noting that the state possesses an acknowledged responsibility for the incompetent and
that the state has a system in place equipped to protect the incompetent individual).
Some patients are clearly incapable of making decisions for themselves even though
guardianship proceedings have not been undertaken. Families or next of kin are usually
permitted to make treatment decisions for these patients. See generally T. GRIsso, EVALUAT-
ING CoMEEcIEs (1986); Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Ma-
jor Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 306-07 (1944).
203. S. S~um & R. MEYEa, supra note 29, at 103 (arguing that the preferred approach
is to tailor the consent process to the patient's condition).
204. Id.
,205. See generally Ewald, Medical Decision-Making for Children: An Analysis of
Competing Interests, 25 ST. Lotis U. J. 689, 690-700 (1982) (tracing the history of the
parental consent requirement).
206. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
207. Id. at 606, 611-13; see also Comment, Parents, Children and the Institutional-
ization Process-A Constitutional Analysis, 83 DICK. L. Rnv. 261, 283-85 (1979) (suggesting
that the Constitution does not require states to afford minors the full complement of due
process protections).
208. See Planned Parenthood As'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93 (1983); Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983). States may require,
however, that parents be informed before an abortion is conducted, unless the minor dem-
onstrates in court that she is sufficiently mature to make the decision without parental in-
volvement. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2979-80 (1990);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2947-48 (1990). See also Carey v. Population Serv.
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the abortion decision as a more critically important personal deci-
sion than admission to a mental hospital. The extent to which par-
ents may consent to particularly invasive therapy (for example,
ECT or some aversive therapies) over the objection of their chil-
dren is unclear. Inasmuch as these therapies may substantially
change the thinking or "mentation" of children, a strong argument
can be made that the children, particularly older children, have
legal rights and, therefore, they should be included in the informed
consent process. 209
IV. PROTECTING THIRD PARTIES FROM DANGEROUS PATIENTS
The obligation of mental health professionals to protect third
parties from dangerous patients is the most controversial recent
malpractice development. This issue raises fundamental questions
concerning the relationship among the patient, the mental health
professional, and society. The two major forms of obligations to
third parties are generally referred to as "the duty to protect (or to
warn)" and "the duty to report. 210 Although examples are rela-
tively rare, liability may be imposed for the negligent release of an
involuntarily committed patient who is dangerous; such cases have
resulted in substantial recovery.1
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977) (concluding that the abortion and contraception rights of
minors are based on constitutional privacy).
209. The strongest argument for allowing minors to make or participate in making
treatment decisions exists when treatment would invade a fundamental right of a minor. An
example is permanent sterilization, when the treatment would make irreversible changes
and the minor is close to the legal age of majority. It is highly unlikely that the law would
permit parents to consent to sterilization of a minor. In situations in which the person is
severely mentally retarded and will never have legal competency, there has been reluctance
to permit the guardian to consent to sterilization. See Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the
Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.CL. REv. 943, 977-78
(1982).
210. Refer to notes 212-33 and 246-60 infra and accompanying text. The duty to re-
port, which emphasizes reporting to state authorities (such as a child protective services
agency), is distinguished from the duty to protect or warn, which emphasizes the intended
victim. The two concepts are related because protecting a potential victim may involve call-
ing the police or other authorities.
211. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Wofford v. Eastern State Hosp., 795
P.2d 516 (Okla. 1990); Poythress, Avoiding Negligent Release. Contemporary Clinical and
Risk Management Strategies, 147 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 994, 994-95 (1990) (reporting verdicts
ranging from $6.75 million to $25 million and suggesting that because of out-of-court settle-
ments there are more negligent release cases than generally recognized). See generally
Poythress, Avoiding Negligent Release: A Risk Management Strategy, 38 HosP. & Commu-
NIrr PSYCHIATRY 1051 (1987) (suggesting ways of avoiding liability); Schwartz & Pinsker,
Mediating Retention or Release of the Potentially Dangerous Patient, 38 HosP. & COMMU-
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A. The Duty to Protect (or Warn)
The landmark decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California21 2 began to establish that therapists have a duty
to take reasonable steps to protect potential victims from serious
harm. Psychologists at the U.C.-Berkeley mental health clinic de-
termined that one of their patients, Mr. Poddar, was dangerous
and might kill a woman, Ms. Tarasoff, whom he thought was
spurning his advances.21  The clinic called the campus police who
talked to Poddar and released him. 14 Poddar later killed Tarasoff,
and her parents sued the university health service for failure to
take appropriate action to protect Tarasoff from Poddar210 The
California Supreme Court held that the clinic could be sued on the
basis that it failed to take reasonable action to protect Ms.
Tarasoff, such as warning her about Poddar's intention to kill
her.21" The court thus imposed an obligation on therapists to take
Nrr' PSYCHIATRY 75, 75-76 (1987) (noting the difficulty and risk of release decisions).
212. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1976).
213. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 431-32, 551 P.2d at 340-41, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
216. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
The arguments against imposing Tarasoff-type liability include the following- (1) the
duty to warn is based on the ability of mental health professionals to predict dangerousness,
and such predictions cannot be made with any degree of confidence; (2) warning intended
victims will require that the confidences of therapy be revealed, and this breach of confi-
dence will interfere with therapy among the very people whom we would like to have in
therapy and will interfere with the privacy of those in therapy; (3) there are substantial
overpredictions of dangerousness, so many people who are in fact not dangerous will have
their therapy interrupted by unnecessary warnings to victims; (4) it is unusual and unfair to
require "rescue" of third parties; (5) once patients who have aggressive feelings understand
that there is a duty to warn, they will not reveal these feelings in therapy for fear of the
disclosure, and therefore, over the long run, the duty to warn will largely be self-defeating
by discouraging disclosure of aggression; and (6) even if some good can be accomplished by
a duty to warn, the costs to therapy exceed the potential benefits of such disclosures.
Among the arguments in favor of imposing a Tarasoff-type duty to warn are the follow-
ing. (1) the therapist should try to avoid unnecessary death or serious injury, because avoid-
ing unnecessary death or injury is so important that interference with therapy or the right
of privacy is comparatively trivial; (2) the duty imposed is not without precedent because
professionals are sometimes required to act in the interest of society rather than a client or
patient, e.g., the duty to isolate or report some serious, infectious diseases; (3) patients are
not likely to refuse to disclose matters in therapy because of the threat that the therapist
will warn potential victims; (4) although the prediction of dangerousne-s is not perfect, it is
sufficiently accurate to be the basis of a warning when a patient is apparently dangerous; (5)
if these predictions can be the basis for involuntary commitment, they surely are accurate
enough to provide the basis for a warning, and (6) overpredictions of dangerousne-s result-
ing in some unnecessary warnings is a relatively small price to pay to avoid murders and
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reasonable steps to protect the intended victim. Subsequent
courts, however, emphasized the "duty to warn" the intended vic-
tim of the danger so the victim could take steps to protect herself.
The several cases that followed the Tarasoif decision are com-
monly referred to collectively as Tarasoff.217
The Tarasoff decision was unusual in that it imposed on ther-
apists a duty to the public arising out of the treatment of individ-
ual patients.21 Some commentators have viewed Tarasoff as vio-
lating the principle that, absent special responsibility, one is not
required to rescue persons from harm.2 19 The court based this duty
to protect or warn on the therapist-client relationship and a bal-
ance between the costs and benefits of such warnings.2 20 By volun-
tarily entering the practice of therapy, the therapist assumed a re-
sponsibility to the public to avoid this public harm.221 Although
commonly called the "duty to warn," this phrase does not accu-
rately describe the duty, since it requires reasonable steps to pro-
tect potential victims from dangerous patients.2 22
serious injury.
217. A number of excellent articles have considered this case. See, e.g., Roth & Meisel,
Dangerousness, Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn, 134 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 508, 511
(1977) (suggesting action by psychiatrists that minimizes the undesirable consequences of
Tarasoff); Stone, The Tarasoff Decision: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90
HARv. L. REV. 358, 358 (1976) (asserting that if society introduces greater safeguards into
involuntary civil commitment procedures, it must also accept the increased risk that poten-
tially violent and mentally disturbed people will remain free); Note, Imposing a Duty to
Warn on Psychiatrists-A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO. L.
Rv. 283, 286 (1977) (criticizing the abandonment of the foreseeability test and the counter-
productivity of the Tarasoff decision).
218. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 446-47, 551 P.2d 334, 351, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 31 (1976).
219. There is ordinarily no legal duty to rescue another, even though the rescue may
be accomplished without risk. See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 400, 400, 59 N.E.
1058, 1058 (1901) (physician not liable for failing, without any reason, to aid a violently ill
person). One walking along a beach, and seeing someone drowning, is generally not legally
obligated to throw a nearby lifesaver. A duty does exist, however, if the rescuer is in some
way responsible for the victim-if, for example, the rescuer has pushed the victim into the
water or there is a parent-child relationship. See, e.g., Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d 320,
323, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (parents had duty to control obviously dangerous
child). Some criticize the rule as being inefficient and rewarding immoral conduct, while
others praise it as an important part of individual freedom. Some states have passed stat-
utes requiring certain forms of rescue. For example, two states require people to render aid
to others in grave danger when they can do so without peril. See IfNN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05
(West 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
220. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (stating that
"protective privilege ends where the public peril begins").
221. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
222. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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The Tarasoff decision left many unanswered questions about
the duty the court imposed.2 2 Among the most discussed issues
has been the "identifiable victim" issue-whether the duty applies
only when a specific victim is identified.2 2 The trend has been to
require an identifiable victim. 225 Under this approach, the duty
does not apply when a therapist fears that a patient is likely to
hurt someone but does not know who may be harmed. Some deci-
sions seem to have expanded the concept of the known victim. For
example, the California Supreme Court indicated that the son of a
woman who was the intended victim may also be an identifiable
victim. 226 The son suffered emotional trauma when his mother was
shot while attempting to protect him from injury.2 27 The California
Supreme Court held that the son was an identifiable victim to the
therapist because it was foreseeable that the son might be present
during the attack on the mother; therefore, the son could recover
from the therapist.228 However, not all courts have embraced this
"known victim" approach.22
9
223. What professionals have this duty? How much information may or must be re-
vealed when a warning is given? What is the precise nature of the duty and how can the
duty be fulfilled? When several people know of the dangerousness, who has the duty to act?
What does dangerousness include (physical injury, property damage, emotional injury to
others)? At what level of certainty concerning dangerousness does the duty to act exist?
Most of these questions have not yet been fully answered by those states adopting the duty.
224. See, e.g., Carlson, Friedman & Riggert, The Duty to Warn/Protect" Issues in
Clinical Practice, 15 BuuJ An AcA6. PsYCHATRY & L. 179, 185 (1987) (reasonable care must
be taken to protect unnamed victims); Crocker, Judicial Expansion of the Tarasoff Doc-
trine: Doctors Dilemma, 13 J. PSYCHiATRY & L 83, 83 (1988) (discussing how several cases
have dealt with foreseeability issue); Gross, Southard, Lamb & Weinberger, Assessing Dan-
gerousness and Responding Appropriately. Hedlund Expands the Clinician's Liability Es-
tablished by Tarasoff, 48 J. CLINICAL PsYcuATRY 9, 11 (1987) (discussing what clinicians
should look for after hearing a patient make threats); Mills, Sullivan & Eth, Protecting
Third Parties: A Decade After Tarasoff, 144 Am J. PsycmATRY 68, 70 (1937) (reasoning that
the circumstances may not require identifying the victim).
225. See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,748,614 P.2d 728,735,
167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 77 (1980) (no duty to warn of the release of an inmate who has made
nonspecific threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims).
226. Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 700, 669 P.2d 41, 46, 194 Cal. Rptr.
805, 809 (1983); see also Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 48 Cal. 3d 583,
585, 770 P.2d 278, 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 (1989) (concluding that the mother of a sexu-
ally assaulted child is a potential victim since mother and child were being counselled by
psychologist guilty of sexual assault).
227. Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 700, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
228. Id. at 700, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
229. See, e.g., Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 203, 296 S.E,2d 693, 697
(1982) (hospital liable to children of a woman murdered by her husband when hospital knew
that husband intended to kill wife but released him anyway).
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The identifiable victim issue is related to the question of how
the duty may be discharged. If the duty is to "warn", there gener-
ally must be a known victim in order to issue the warning.2 30 If, on
the other hand, the therapist's duty focuses on taking reasonable
steps to avoid injury, then an identifiable victim rule is not essen-
tial. When a therapist perceives a real threat to unspecified people,
it is still possible to take action (civil commitment or notice to au-
thorities) to avoid the injury.
Most state courts that have considered the question have
adopted a duty to protect or warn rule,231 and there has been only
limited reluctance to impose liability.2 2 Tarasoff is thus rapidly
emerging as a generally accepted legal and ethical doctrine. Ther-
apists usually take some action when faced with a dangerous pa-
tient, and many therapists identify a "duty to warn" as an ethical
or moral duty as well as a legal duty.2 3
B. Tarasoff Statutes
The adoption of Tarasoff statutes by more than a dozen
states234 is an unfortunate development. The mental health profes-
230. Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983) (duty to warn arises
if victim is foreseeable).
231. See, e.g., Bradley Center, 296 S.E.2d at 695 (Georgia law imposes duty to con-
form to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unrea-
sonable risk of harm); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 476, 403 A.2d 600, 511 (Law
Div. 1979) (a therapist may have a duty to take steps reasonably necessary to protect an
intended or potential victim of his patient when he determines or should determine that the
victim is in danger); Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison County, 146 Vt. 61, 65, 499 A.2d
422, 426 (1985) (involving property damage rather than injury to persons).
232. See, e.g., Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 480 454 A.2d 414,
420 (1983) (neither psychiatrist nor hospital's director of admissions liable when patient
murdered a boy, absent identity of intended victim and a special relationship with victim).
See generally Note, The Scope of a Psychiatrist's Duty to Third Persons: The Protective
Privilege Ends Where the Public Peril Begins, 59 NorE DAME L. REV. 770, 772 (1984)
(discussing scope of therapist's duty as determined by courts and public policy).
233. See Givelber, Bowers & Bltch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study
of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443, 475; Special Project, Where the Public
Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN.
L. REv. 165, 183 (1978); Comment, Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn: Ten Years After
Tarasoff, 15 GOLDEN GATE UL. REv. 271, 293 (1985). For a review of the current practice of
psychologists, see Pope, Tabachnick & Keith-Spiegel, Ethics of Practice: The Beliefs and
Behaviors of Psychologists as Therapists, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 993, 995 (1987) (reporting
that 41.9% of surveyed psychologists have broken confidentiality if a client was homicidal;
another 16.2% said they sometimes did so; and 88% agreed that it was ethical to do so).
234. ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200 (1988); CAL CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1990); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987); FL& STAT. ANN. § 490.0147 (West Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN.
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sions generally promote these statutes, presumably as a way of re-
ducing potential liability and clarifying the nature of any Tarasoff-
type duty.2 5 However, given the reality of the legislative process,
other forces inevitably seek to modify the proposed statutes, and
the resulting laws often do not clarify or limit liability. They may
instead result in confusing the obligations of therapists when
threats are made against third parties.
California, for example, has adopted a statute that provides
for liability only if the patient has told the therapist of a "serious
threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim
or victims. 23 8 The duty is discharged by "reasonable efforts to
communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law en-
forcement agency.' ' 213 This statute broadly follows Tarasoff, but it
emphasizes the duty to warn. Ironically, it may actually have
somewhat expanded the duties of therapists by specifying a warn-
ing to both the victim and to the police.23 8 The emphasis on warn-
§ 34-4-1112.4-1 to 4-4 (West Supp. 1988); KA. STAT. ANN. § 5603 (Supp. 1989); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.400, 645.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. Rnv. STA'. AN. §
9:2800.2 (West Supp. 1990); Ma&s. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 129 (West Supp. 1990); Mum.
STAT. ANN. §§ 148.975-.76 (West Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE AN. §§ 27-1-1101 to 1-1102
(Supp. 1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329.31, 330-A-22 (Supp. 1989); Oto Rzv. CODE: AN& §
5122.34 (Anderson Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-14a-101 to 14a-102 (Supp. 1988);
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120(2) (Supp. 1988).
235. Professional organizations have proposed model Tarasoff statutes, see, eg., note
238 infra, and have actively lobbied for them in several states. See Slovenko, Michigan's
Duty to 'Protect" Legislation: What Has MPS Wrought?, 14 AAPL NnwsL. 109 (1989). In
addition to the statute proposed by an arm of the American Psychiatric Association, the
American Psychological Association has circulated a similar model That proposal is re-
printed in McCarty, Patient Threats Against Third Parties: The Psychotherapist's Duty of
Reasonable Care, 5 CoNzsiP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 119, 135 (1989). Another proposal is con-
tained in Note, The Duty to Warn Third Parties: A Retrospective on Tarasoff, 18 Rtrmns
L.J. 145, 162-63 (1986).
236. CAL Civ. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1990).
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. The Council on Psychiatry and Law of the American Psychiatric Association has
proposed a model statute which avoids some of the ambiguity of several of the state stat-
utes. The following is the text of the model statute.
Developed by the Council on Psychiatry and Law and approved by the Board
of Trustees in June 1987, this resource document does not represent official APA
policy but rather is offered as a guide to District Branches in those states in which
case law has expanded the potential "duty to protect" liability of psychiatrists.
Section - Duty of [Physicians] to Take Precautions Against Patient
Violence.
1. Scope of cause of action. Except as provided in paragraph 5, no cause of
action shall lie against a [physician], nor shall legal liability be imposed, for
breaching a duty to prevent harm to person or property caused by a patient unless
a) the patient has communicated to the [physician] an explicit threat to kill or
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ing is unfortunate because it may encourage therapists to warn po-
tential victims without adequately considering other, possibly more
effective, ways of protecting both the public and the therapists'
patients.
Some states, where no case clearly establishes a Tarasoff duty,
have adopted the duty by statute, apparently as a "preemptive
strike" against the possibility of court-imposed liability. For exam-
ple, Kentucky adopted a statute in 1986 that imposes obligations
seriously injure a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim or victims, or
to destroy property under circumstances likely to lead to serious personal injury
or death, and the patient has the apparent intent and ability to carry out the
threat; and b) the [physician] fails to take such reasonable precautions to prevent
the threatened harm as would be taken by a reasonably prudent [physician] under
the same circumstances. Reasonable precautions include, but are not limited to,
those specified in paragraph 2.
2. Legally sufficient precautions. Any duty owed by a [physician] to take rea-
sonable precautions to prevent harm threatened by a patient is discharged, as a
matter of law, if the [physician] either a) communicates the threat to any identi-
fied victim or victims; or b) notifies a law enforcement agency in the vicinity
where the patient or any potential victim resides; or c) arranges for the patient to
be hospitalized voluntarily; or d) takes legally appropriate steps to initiated pro-
ceedings for involuntary hospitalization.
3. Immunity for disclosure. Whenever a patient has explicitly threatened to
cause serious harm to person or property, or a [physician] otherwise concludes
that a patient is likely to do so, and the [physician], for the purpose of reducing
the risk of harm, discloses any confidential communications made by or relating to
the patient, no cause of action shall lie against the [physicians] for making such
disclosure.
4. Definitions.
a. For purposes of this [section], "patient" means any person with whom a
[physician] has established a [physician]-patient relationship.
b. For purposes of this [section], ["physician"] means a person licensed to
practice medicine in this state.
5. Limited applicability of this section. This section does not modify any
duty to tike precautions to prevent harm by a patient that may arise if the pa-
tient is within the custodial responsibility of a hospital or other facility or is being
discharged therefrom.
COUNCIL ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, MODEL STATUTE ON THE
PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST PATIENT VIOLENCE (1987), reprinted in
Applebaum, Zonana, Bonnie & Roth, Statutory Approaches to Limiting Psychiatrists' Lia-
bility for Their Patients' Violent Acts, 146 AM. J. PsYCIATRY 821, 827 (1989). The model,
however, still creates uncertainty in this "pure" form. For example, by leaving an expansive
definition of "reasonable precautions" at the end of paragraph 1, the model invites courts to
determine that a physician must take additional precautions not listed in paragraph 2. Par-
agraph 1 of the model also requires action when there are "reasonably identifiable" victims,
thus leaving open the fairly broad duty that many therapists have objected to. Furthermore,
paragraph 1 implies that the identifiable victim requirement is eliminated when a patient
threatens to "destroy property under circumstances likely to lead to serious personal injury
or death." Id. For other model statutes, refer to note 235 supra.
MENTAL HEALTH MALPRACTICE
on therapists beyond those required in California by apparently es-
tablishing a duty to take action even when no particular victim is
identifiable.2 39 That duty may be discharged by warning the police
and/or (it is not clear which) by seeking civil commitment.2 40 This
statute is filled with ambiguities and contradictions that increase
rather than decrease the level of confusion about the duty to
protect.
On the other hand, Ohio contains a new statutory provision
that appears to eliminate all Tarasoff-type liability.2 " This provi-
sion, however, is placed in the statutes dealing with civil commit-
ment. 42 It may, therefore, apply only to a fairly narrow band of
cases where a mental health professional has been involved in an
involuntary civil commitment proceeding.
There are a number of problems with these statutes.243 They
are not well written. They often contain ambiguous and confusing
language. The Kentucky statute, for example, is nearly unintel-
ligible.24 4 The sloppiness of the statutes has resulted in provisions
that may lead courts to interpret them as expanding therapists'
liability.2 45 Furthermore, it is difficult to find a broad, consistent
principle on which to base the Tarasoff statutes. If, for example,
the reason for opposing Tarasoff-type liability is because confiden-
tiality is essential to successful treatment, then a broader proposal
(including liability for breach of confidentiality) to protect confi-
dentiality should be part of the effort to adopt Tarasoff statutes
because Tarasoff liability is not the primary threat to the confiden-
tiality of therapy.246 If therapists cannot predict dangerousness ac-
curately enough to impose Tarasoff liability fairly, then little basis
exists to rely on such predictions of dangerousness in areas such as
civil commitment.247 More than principled efforts to improve the
239. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400 (Michie/Bobb-Merrill Supp. 1990).
240. Id. at § 202A.400(2). The statute provides that "when... no particular victim is
identifiable, the duty to warn has been discharged if reasonable efforts are made to commu-
nicate the threat to law enforcement authorities." Id.
241. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.34 (Anderson Supp. 1989).
242. Id.
243. See Appelbaum, Zonana, Bonnie & Roth, supra note 238, at 822-27. But see
Note, Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Act of
Their Patients, 64 INn. LJ. 391, 401-20 (1989) (positively evaluating these statutes).
244. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
245. Slovenko, supra note 235.
246. See generally Smith, supra note 44, at 549-56 (discussing an integrated approach
to confidentiality).
247. Mental health professions have noted that predictions of dangerousness are not
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law, these statutes appear to be an exercise of political power in an
effort to avoid liability.
The current experience with Tarasoff statutes supports an ar-
gument against relying on legislative solutions to mental health
malpractice issues. The medical malpractice reform movement in
the last two decades has produced legislative reforms that are only
partially effective and sometimes unconstitutional.24 If mental
health malpractice continues to increase in the 1990s, as many ex-
pect, the temptation to seek statutory reforms to eliminate some of
the liability will be great. If the Tarasoff statutes are any indica-
tion, this temptation probably should be resisted.
C. Reporting Obligations
States also try to protect third parties from injury by requir-
ing that professionals report abuse that has occurred or is sus-
pected. All states have child abuse reporting statutes,249 and an in-
creasing number have laws that require persons to report other
forms of abuse, such as spouse or elder abuse. 80 By requiring re-
porting, the state can intervene to prevent further injury and may
very reliable. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920-29 (1983) (Blackmun J., dis-
senting) (discussing reliability of dangerousness predictions). Nevertheless, mental health
professionals continue to make these predictions in a variety of judicial proceedings, such as
civil commitment hearings. The prediction of dangerousness argument in Tarasoff-type
cases therefore loses some of its punch.
248. For examples of cases holding reform statutes unconstitutional, see Kenyon v.
Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 87, 688 P.2d 961, 979 (1984); McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401, 414
(Ky. 1977); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 833-39 (1980); see also Smith,
Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws,
38 OKLA. L. REv. 195, 208 (1985) (noting that state constitutional challenges to medical mal-
practice reforms are increasingly successful). Regarding the efficacy of reforms, see U.S.
Gov'T GEN. Accr. OFF., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. SIX STATE CASE STUDIES SHOW CLAIMS AND
INsURANcE COSTS STILL RISE DESPrr REFORMS (1986). But see Danzon, The Frequency and
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 LAW. & CoNTEn. PROBS. 57, 78
(1986) (presenting empirical evidence that statutes mandating offset of collateral benefits or
placing caps on awards have reduced claim severity, but that no other reform has had a
significant impact on malpractice claims).
249. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems and Future Direc-
tions, 17 FM. L.Q. 151, 153-55 (1983); Fraser, A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis
of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHL[-]KENT L. REV. 641, 649-86
(1978); Newberger, The Helping Hand Strikes Again: Unintended Consequences of Child
Abuse Reporting, 12 J. CLINIc AL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 307, 307 (1983).
250. See Smith, supra note 44, at 511-12, 530-31; Note, Mandatory Reporting of Elder
Abuse: A Cheap But Ineffective Solution to the Problem, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723, 735-53
(1986); Note, Elder Abuse: The Merit of Mandatory Reporting Laws and the Minnesota
Response, 9 W. Mrrc E.L L. Rav. 365, 375-83 (1984).
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decide whether or not to prosecute the abuser.
Many state abuse reporting laws require the reporting of
known or suspected physical, sexual, or mental abuse, or neglect.
Typically, abuse and neglect are very broadly defined in these stat-
utes.251 The obligation to report arises regardless of the source of
the information.2 52 Therefore, a mental health professional who
learns of abuse from a patient seeking treatment to stop the abuse
must report that abuse to the state.2 53 The failure to file the re-
quired reports may result in criminal and civil liability.2 " Some
states specifically provide civil liability for failure to report.2 5
Even in states without statutory liability, it is likely that negli-
gence liability would be imposed for the failure to report abuse.5
Only a limited number of civil cases have resulted from the failure
to report. If courts interpret reporting statutes as broadly as they
are written, however, the failure to report abuse or neglect could
one day become a more significant source of liability than Tarasoff
cases.
257
The U.S. Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County 55 indicated that states are not liable under federal law for
failure to take action to protect abused and neglected children.250
This decision, however, would not protect individual practitioners
or institutions from liability for their failure to report suspected
child abuse or neglect as required by state law. Therefore, mental
health professionals may face liability for the failure to report
251. See Smith, supra note 44, at 510.
252. Appelbaum & Meisel, Therapists' Obligations to Report Their Patients' Crimi-
nal Acts, 14 BuL. ALL AcAx. PsYCH.ATRY L. 221, 224-26 (1986); Miller & Weinstock, Conflict
of Interest Between Therapist-Patient Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Sexual
Abuse of Children, 5 BEAV. SOL & L. 161, 161-62 (1987); Weinstock & Weinstock, Child
Abuse Reporting Trends: An Unprecedented Threat to Confidentiality, 33 J. FoRENsic Sc.
418, 419 (1988).
253. See Smith & Meyer, supra note 130, at 352-53.
254. Id. at 356-57.
255. Iowa and New York statutes provide that anyone required to report who fails to
do so shall be "civilly liable for the damages proximately caused by such failare." See IowA
CODE ANN. § 232.75(2) (West 1989); N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAw § 420(2) (McKinney 1983).
256. See Isaacson, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes: The Case for Holding Physicians
Civilly Liable for Failing to Report, 12 SAN Dimo L. REV. 743, 755-62 (1975); Note, Physi-
cian's Liability for Failure to Diagnose and Report Child Abuse, 23 WAYN L. Rav. 1187,
1193-94 (1977).
257. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 413-15, 551 P.2d 389, 396-98, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 76-78 (1976); Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 54 Cm.
[-IKENT L Rhv. 753, 760-64 (1978).
258. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
259. Id. at 197.
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abuse or neglect.26 0
V. INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
Health care institutions have experienced increases in mental
health malpractice liability at least as great as individual practi-
tioners. Legal developments have weakened or eliminated some de-
fenses once available to institutions.6 1 Courts increasingly hold in-
stitutions responsible for the torts committed by individual
practitioners within the institutions.282 Thus, the increase in indi-
vidual liability has a direct impact on institutions.0 3 Also, new
health care delivery arrangements are resulting in even greater lia-
bility for the malpractice of institutions' contract and employee
professionals.2 '
Institutions and other principals incur liability for the torts of
their employees and agents in two ways: negligence for failure to
provide adequate care in selection and supervision, and vicarious
liability.26 5 Health institutions have a clear obligation to exercise
care in selecting their employees and professional staff and in
granting practice privileges to nonemployee professionals. 2"6 Dur-
ing the last two decades, health institutions have become responsi-
260. Refer to notes 265-67 infra and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., PROSS.R & KEE-rON ON TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 131, 133 (demonstrat-
ing the near elimination of charitable immunity and the weakening of governmental immu-
nities); Felthous, Liability of Treaters for Injuries to Others: Erosion of Three Immunities,
15 BULL. AM. AcAD. PsYcmATRY & L. 115, 115 (1987) (observing the decline of common law
doctrines protecting mental health practioners: non-responsibility, sovereign immunity, and
the "honest error" rule); Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and Their Con-
tinuing Immunity, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1382, 1383-86 (1977) (describing the rise, fall and par-
tial resurgence of charitable immunity).
262. Smith, Hospital Liability for Physician Negligence, 251 J. A.M. 447, 447 (1984).
263. Refer to notes 265-67 infra and accompanying text. The enlargement of the duty
to supervise carefully and the more frequent imposition of vicarious liability, coupled with
an increase in the level of individual malpractice exposure has resulted in significant liabil-
ity changes for institutions. Nesterowicz, Hospitals' Liability in American Law, 6 MED. L.
553 (1987).
264. Smith, supra note 262, at 447.
265. See Lisko, Hospital Liability Under Theories of Respondeat Superior and Cor-
porate Negligence, 47 UMKC L. Rsv. 171, 171 (1978); Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two
Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 2 (1983); see also Note, Kirk v. Michael
Reese Hospital: A Hospital's Liability as a Health Care Provider, 19 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1261,
1263 (1988); Comment, Evolving Theories of Malpractice Liability for HMOs, 20 Lov. U.
Cm. L.J. 841, 872 (1989).
266. Lisko, supra note 265, at 181-82; see also Copeland & Brown, Hospital Medical
Staff Privilege Issues: "Brother's Keeper" Revisited, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 513, 513-17 (1990)
(reviewing hospital corporate responsibility doctrine).
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ble for providing an increasingly higher level of supervision0 7 and
for conducting periodic reviews to assess the quality of practice of
professionals. Institutions may face liability if they fail to take
minimal steps to ensure that professionals do not exceed the areas
of authorized practice.
The professions themselves recognize the importance of this
supervision in their accreditation requirements and professional
standards.268 As institutions become more complex and include a
greater range of professionals, supervision becomes increasingly
important. All institutions should have formal, periodic staff re-
views to ensure that their mental health practitioners and other
professionals are competent, have the necessary training for prac-
tice, have adequate supervision, and limit their practice to those
areas in which they have demonstrated competence.
Because the law imposes vicarious liability on mental health
institutions whether or not they have exercised all possible care,2 9
the rules of agency have a significant impact on the level of institu-
tional liability.270 Traditionally, institutions were vicariously liable
only for the torts of their agents. 71 Vicarious liability did not arise
from the actions of other potential tortfeasors, for example physi-
cians with staff privileges, because there was no employment rela-
tionship and the physician was merely an independent contrac-
tor.272 That doctrine has significantly eroded in recent years.273
Courts increasingly find mental health institutions vicariously
liable for the torts of independent professionals under the doctrine
267. This trend was established by Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hasp.,
33 II. 2d 326, 329, 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1965) (holding hospital liable for failing to require
doctor to update his skills and inadequately supervising the doctor's procedures), cert. de-
nied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
268. See, e.g., JOINT CoM&. ON THE AccREDITATION OF HIn.THcAn O1sM. ACCRitrA-
TION MANUAL FOR HosPrrALs (1990 ed.) (establishing detailed standards that include provi-
sions for the careful evaluation and supervision of those practicing in hospitals); Roberts,
Coale & Redman, A History of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 258 J.
AMA. 936, 938-40 (1987) (detailing the history of the Joint Comm, ion's accreditation
requirements).
269. See Southwick, supra note 265, at 3-4. The employees themselves are also di-
rectly responsible for their own negligence. Id.
270. See PRossER & KE-mEN ON ToRTS, supra note 35, § 70, at 460 (citing the Restate-
ment of Agency when discussing implied negligence).
271. See Southwick, supra note 265, at 6-7.
272. Klages, Medical Malpractice Liability from a Hospital's Perspective, 77 ILL BJ.
34, 34 (1988); Southwick, supra note 265, at 5.
273. Klages, supra note 272, at 34.
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of "ostensible" or "apparent" agency. 274 This doctrine applies if
the institution or professional gives the public the impression that
the professional is an agent or employee of the institution.275 Ad-
vertising, group practice, professional listings, and the like all may
give the appearance of an agency relationship and set up ostensible
agency vicarious liability. 27 6
Like practitioners, institutions also face new duties to protect
people other than their patients.2 77 Tarasoff provides one promi-
nent example.27 '8 That case arose in an institutional setting, a clinic
at the University of California. 7 Child abuse reporting statutes
may impose institutional liability as well.2 Other similar obliga-
tions are not hard to imagine. For example, some states may im-
pose an obligation to take steps to protect the spouse of an HIV-
positive patient who continues to engage in conduct that may
transmit the disease to her.28 Such problems often involve very
difficult conflicts between the ethical and legal duties to protect
others and the confidentiality of patients. 82 Furthermore, these
problems generally arise very quickly, allowing institutions little
274. See Southwick, supra note 265, at 10.
275. Firman, Ostensible Agency: Another Malpractice Hazard, 145 Am. J. PSYCHiATRY
510, 511 (1988); Note, Hospital Vicarious Liability for the Negligence of Independent Con-
tractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of the Ostensible Agency Doctrine in Ohio, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 711, 711 (1987); Brown, Hospital Liability Law: Cost Containment, Marketing
and Consumer Expectation, 55 Dm. CouNs. J. 159, 164 (1988).
276. A. THOMPSON, GUME TO ETHicAL PRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 26-30, 218-19
(1990).
277. Refer to notes 247-60 supra and accompanying text.
278. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 348,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 28 (1976).
279. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
280. Refer to notes 249-60 supra and accompanying text. All states have reporting
statutes, and in most states mental health institutions would have an obligation to report
abuse. Smith & Meyer, supra note 130, at 351-53.
281. See, e.g., AMA, Prevention and Control of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome: An Interim Report, 258 J. A.M.A. 2097, 2103 (1987) (recommending the drafting of
statutes which require that public health officials, rather than physicians, inform individuals
at risk); Labowitz, Beyond Tarasoff: AIDS and the Obligation to Breach Confidentiality, 9
ST. Louis J. PUS. L. REv. 495, 516 (1990) (counseling doctors that states may have a duty to
warn spouses and known partners); Note, AIDS: Establishing a Physician's Duty to Warn,
21 RUTGERS L J. 645, 657-64 (1990) (suggesting a physician's duty to warn based on
Tarasoff); Comment, Doctor-Patient Confidentiality Versus Duty to Warn in the Context
of AIDS Patients and Their Partners, 47 MD. L. REv. 675, 681 (1988) (observing that some
jurisdictions require a doctor to warn other persons of a patient's illness).
282. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438-43, 551 P.2d at 345-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-28
(discussing the conflicting interests of confidential psychotherapeutic communication and
public safety).
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time to consider fully the options and the conflicting duties. There-
fore, institutions should have clear, written protocols for handling
reports of abuse or patients' threats against third parties.
Liability may also arise from the research and teaching con-
ducted in an institution. 8 3 Human research activities are now
fairly well controlled in most institutions as a result of federal reg-
ulations, institutional review boards ("IRB"s), and ethics commit-
tees.2 Institutions without these IRBs or ethics reviews should re-
quire express authorization for any human experimentation
conducted in their facilities. 85
Mental health professionals receive substantial clinical or
practical experience during their training. Those still in training
assess, counsel, and treat patients. Student practice raises legal is-
sues regarding adequate supervision and review, methods of ensur-
ing acceptable levels of care, and the adequacy of informed con-
sent.28 ' There are few reported legal cases involving injuries
suffered because of inadequate treatment by those in training. 87 It
may be that patients do not recognize most instances in which stu-
dent malpractice has occurred.28 Another possibility is that attor-
neys, many of whom received little formal clinical training in law
283. When mental health professionals engage in research or teaching, they frequently
involve their patients. Using patients for a purpose that is not solely directed toward help-
ing the patient triggers special legal and ethical obligations to protect the patient from un-
necessary risks and to ensure patient autonomy through the informed consent process. A.
THOMPSON, supra note 276, at 47-52.
284. See generally S. SmrrH & R. MEYER, supra note 29, at 189-227 (1937) (discussing
issues related to experimentation).
285. Recent changes in federal law and some state laws also obligate institutions that
undertake animal research to carefully review the research and the care given the animals.
See, e.g., 9 CY.FR. §§ 1.1-3.142 (1990); 48 C.F.R. §§ 380.202-380.205 (1989). These regulations
provide for the care and treatment of animals and require the formation of institutional
committees to review the proposed use of animals in research. See Dresser, Research on
Animals: Values, Politics, and Regulatory Reform, 58 S. CAL T. REv. 1147, 1165-70 (1985).
286. See Kapp, Supervising Professional Trainees: Legal Implications for Mental
Health Institutions and Practitioners, 35 Hosp. & CoUMuNIrY PsYcHuATY 143, 143-45
(1984).
287. See, e.g., McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1972) (young resi-
dent misdiagnosed an imminent heart attack as gastrointestinal disturbance); Rush v. Akron
Gen. Hosp., 84 Ohio App. 2d 292, 171 N.E.2d 378, 379 (1957) (intern failed to probe wound
for pieces of glass before closing with stitches); cf. Kapp, Legal Implications of Clinical
Supervision of Medical Students and Residents, 58 J. MED. EDUC. 293, 294 (1983) (demon-
strating the lack of suits grounded on the clinical participation of a student despite patient
objections).
288. Rich, Malpractice Issues in the Academic Medical Center, 36 Dzs. LJ. 641, 646
(1987).
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school, fail to notice or raise the possibility of training-related inju-
ries in other disciplines.
Institutions must ensure that students work under supervision
that is adequate to maintain the quality of treatment and that stu-
dents do not extend themselves beyond their level of training or
expertise.2 89 This obligation goes beyond merely signing treatment
or assessment reports and informing students when they make
mistakes. Supervision should be sufficiently intense to protect pa-
tients from receiving inferior service. It would be unfair to hold
students to the same standard of care as that expected of a fully
trained professional. 90 It would be equally unfair for unsuspecting
patients to bear the risk of inadequate care from those still in
training. An institution should, therefore, provide supervision suffi-
cient to guarantee that the services provided by students do not
fall below the level of fully competent professional care.2 1
The use of patients in research or teaching presents special
informed consent issues.29 12 Deciding whether or not to participate
in an experiment or to accept treatment by someone in training
may be an important matter for some patients. 93 Receiving treat-
ment from a student potentially may affect important legal rights
of the patient, including the confidentiality of information revealed
in therapy.294 Human research subjects have benefitted from con-
siderable legal protection in recent years.29 5 Although similar
mechanisms for protecting teaching subjects have not yet been de-
veloped, many of the considerations that cause concern for re-
289. The amount of supervision required will vary with the student's level of educa-
tion, the complexity of the treatment, and the risk and severity of potential harm to the
patient. The greater the possibility or severity of harm to the patient, the more likely it is
that the student requires full supervision.
290. Rush, 84 Ohio App. 2d at 292, 171 N.E.2d at 381.
291. See Slovenko, Legal Issues in Psychotherapy Supervision, in PSYCHOTHERAPY SU-
PERviSION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 453, 462 (A. Hess ed. 1980).
292. See A. THOMPSON, supra note 276, at 47-52.
293. See Hirsh, Which Physicians are Students?: The Patient Has a Right to Know,
HosP. MED. STAFF, Dec. 1978, at 11, 11-13; Kapp, supra note 287, at 293-94.
294. The law should view students as assistants to their supervising faculty member.
This view would protect confidences revealed to a student under the same psychotherapist-
patient privilege that covers the supervising faculty member. It appears, however, that all
states may not adopt this concept. One California appellate court held that the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege does not cover student interns. People v. Gomez, 134 Cal. App. 3d 874,
881-82, 185 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158-59 (1982). But see Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267, 336 S.E.2d 812,
819-20 (1985) (hinting in dicta that if faced with the issue, the court would apply the privi-
lege to student interns).
295. See S. SMITH & R. M=YR, supra note 29, at 190-94.
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search subjects also arise with teaching subjects. By serving as
teaching subjects, patients may be at increased risk, their privacy
may be invaded more frequently, and their treatment needs may
conflict with the teaching interests of the institution. These risks
make informed consent particularly important in teaching as well
as research. A patient's consent to participation in an experiment
or to treatment by those in training should not be assumed; it
should be explicit.
Institutions traditionally have benefited from a number of
special immunities, including charitable immunity and governmen-
tal immunity.29 8 Almost every jurisdiction has eliminated charita-
ble immunity.2 97 Sovereign immunity continues to be a viable de-
fense, but statutes and court decisions continue to reduce its
scope.298 The federal government permits a wide range of liability
suits against federal agencies (including VA hospitals), subject to a
number of important limits. e9 The consequence of this waiver of
immunity is that federal institutions face mental health malprac-
tice liability that often approaches that faced by private
institutions.
VI. LAB-.rrY iN PERSPECTIVE
The extended discussion of current practitioner liability must
be viewed against the background of the very small number of suc-
cessful cases filed against mental health practitioners. 00 Malprac-
tice liability does not represent a looming threat to most institu-
tions or practitioners. Yet, the potential for increased liability
certainly exists.
Institutions and practitioners can take several steps to mini-
296. Refer to note 261 supra.
297. See PRossER & KEEToN ON ToRTs, supra note 35, § 133, at 1070.
298. See, e.g., Frels & Homer, The Interrelationship of Tort Liability, Governmental
Immunity, and the Civil Rights Statutes, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 851, 858-64 (1985) (pointing
out the encroachment on sovereign immunity by the Civil Rights Acts in Texas); Note,
Lately "The King" Can Do Little Right: Idaho Governmental Immunity Doctrine in the
Wake of Sterling v. Bloom, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 291, 292-93 (1988) (d'scusing the degradation
of sovereign liability caused by the Federal Tort Claims Act); Note, The Life and Death of
Governmental Immunity for Governmentally Owned or Operated Hospitals, 1937 DEr. C=.
REv. 565, 577-78 (demonstrating the exceptions to a case purportedly extending governmen-
tal immunity).
299. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No 96-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2674 and other scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1983)).
300. Refer to notes 12-22 supra and accompanying text.
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mize the risks of malpractice.301 They should (1) be particularly
sensitive to maintaining the confidences of therapy and ensure that
confidences are not breached without good reason; (2) obtain in-
formed consent (preferably written) that includes a description of
the hazards of treatment and the existence of alternative treat-
ments; (3) maintain accurate records and not tamper with records
to try to cover up mistakes; (4) be cautious of incomplete or sloppy
testing, histories, and diagnoses; (5) refer the patient to another
professional when the patient could benefit from the referral; (6)
give particular attention to suicidal or dangerous patients and have
sound reasons for any decision not to take action about such pa-
tients; (7) engage in ethical practice (unethical conduct is likely
also to be illegal and subject to liability); (8) avoid engaging in or
even suggesting sexual relationships with patients, former patients,
or close relatives of patients; (9) accept only as many patients or
other obligations as can be carefully and thoughtfully treated; (10)
consider adopting "patient rights" advocates for all institutional-
ized patients to help identify potential problems;302 (11) stay cur-
rent with every area of practice in which work is undertaken; and
(12) be up to date on drug information if drugs are prescribed. 03
301. For discussion of psychotherapist liability risk management, see generally R. Si-
MON. PSYCHIATRIC INTERVENTIONS AND MAPRAccE A PRIMER FOR LAnLrry PREVENTION
(1982); Tan & McDonough, Risk Management in Psychiatry, 13 PSYCHIATRIC CLIN. N. Am.
135, 138-46 (1990); Shapiro, A Clinician's Guide to Reducing the Risk of Malpractice, 6
PSYCHOTHERAPY PRIVATE PRAc. 31 (1987); Horan & Guerrini, Developing Legal Trends in
Psychiatric Malpractice, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 65, 69-85 (1981).
302. By permitting patient advocates to become an integral part of the ongoing treat-
ment plan, they would be available to address the legal issues that frequently arise in
mental health practice. Although patient advocacy is a crucial aspect of all mental health
disciplines, conflicts will inevitably arise over what is in the patient's "best interest." Within
this context, the patient advocate functions as a mediator between the caregiver and the
patient to facilitate conflict resolution and to maintain the therapeutic relationship. Fur-
thermore, the advocate could initiate and continually reevaluate written informed consent
procedures for the therapeutic regime, including individual and group psychotherapy,
psychotropic medication, behavioral therapy, and psychological testing. See generally Dob-
son, Achieving Better Medical Outcomes and Reducing Malpractice Litigation Through
the Healthcare Consumer's Right to Make Decisions, 15 J. CoNrEmp. L. 175, 201-04 (1989)
(urging enforcing consumer rights as a way of reducing malpractice litigation).
303. See generally T. GuTrmm & P. APPELBAUm, CLINICAL HANDOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
n THE LAW 178-203 (1982) (illustrating behavioral, documentational, technical, and con-
sultative approaches to prevention of malpractice); Rothblatt & Leroy,,Avoiding Psychiatric
Malpractice, 9 CAL. WJL. REV. 260, 265-72 (1973) (discussing the development of various
areas of psychiatric malpractice); Soisson, VandeCreek & Knapp, Thorough Record Keep-
ing: A Good Defense in a Litigious Era, 18 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC. 498 (1987)
(exploring guidelines for thorough record keeping); Wills, Preparation and Procedures for
the Courtroom; Insight for the Licensed Professional Counselor, 15 T.A.C.D. J. 91 (1987).
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VIL MALPRACTICE IN THE 1990S
Predicting the direction of mental health malpractice in the
next decade is probably as "accurate" as long-term predictions of
dangerousness. °  Most predictions are based on the false assump-
tion that current trends will continue unabated, but history seldom
moves so simply. The best that can be done is to identify several
factors that will probably affect the direction and extent of mental
health malpractice in the 1990s. These factors suggest that the
number of malpractice claims will increase, but that the growth
will not be explosive. 5 Ironically, one conclusion that can be
drawn from an analysis of such "malpractice factors" is that mal-
practice claims may increase with improvements in mental health
research and rising public expectations about the efficacy of mental
health care.
A. Increasing Liability
To the extent that mental health practice becomes more pre-
cise and standardized, it will be easier to establish a standard of
care against which to evaluate professional practice. This precision
will reduce the difficulty in defining what is inadequate practice,
one of the significant protections against malpractice liability in
the past. Better definitions of what constitutes appropriate treat-
ment for mental conditions will result from several factors. First,
research will continue to provide a more sophisticated understand-
ing of the etiology and diagnosis of emotional conditions. It also
promises to shed some light on what is and is not effective ther-
apy306 In addition, reimbursement systems increasingly demand
some method of determining what therapies are legitimate. Third-
party payers, such as health insurance companies and Medicare,
will reimburse mental health costs only to the extent that standard
304. Such predictions, of course, are notoriously inaccurate. Cf. J. MONAHAN, PREDICT-
ING VioLErNT BEHAvio& AN AssEsmENT Op CLInCAL Tcmm Qns 26, 28 (1981) (concluding
that mental health professionals are highly inaccurate at predicting violent behavior);
Monahan, Risk Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disorderecd. Generating Use-
ful Knowledge, 11 INT'L J. & PSYcHIATRY 249, 251 (1988) (recognizing the inconsistencies
in recent risk assessment research).
305. However, the view of many mental health malpractice experts is that there will
be very significant increases in malpractice liability. Refer to note 7 supra and accompany-
ing text.
306 See S. SmITH & R. MaYa, supra note 29, at 152-55 (research concerning the effi-
cacy of therapy). Refer to notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
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care can be defined with reasonable certainty.10 7 These develop-
ments, therefore, will exert pressure on the professions to define
what is acceptable or effective therapy.308 Such definitions, in turn,
help establish that some treatment is negligent.
Research on the causes of emotional injuries may increase suc-
cessful malpractice claims. Because demonstrating causation is
often difficult in malpractice cases, this research should improve
plaintiffs' ability to prove that element of negligence. Research
may also help prove damages by establishing the presence of emo-
tional injuries. Improvements in therapists' ability to detect pa-
tient malingering or falsification of psychic symptoms will not only
help eliminate false claims of injuries, but will also help prove real
claims of injury.309 Even though no significant breakthroughs are
likely to occur during the 1990s, this research should gradually be-
gin to remove some of the de facto causation and injury defenses
that mental health defendants have used in negligent diagnosis
and treatment cases.
If the use of some physical therapies, notably drugs, increases,
the potential number of physical injuries may also increase. Physi-
cal injuries tend to result in clearer liability than mental injuries
because the injury is easier to prove. In addition, if the injury re-
sults from drug use, the standard of care for the use of prescription
drugs is generally clearer than it is for other therapy.310
Public perceptions of a profession affect potential malpractice
liability in inconsistent ways. The more the public perceives that a
307. Smith, A Crazy System: Mental Health Care Delivery in America, 5 J. CoNTrzu.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 75, 83-92, 112 (1989) (observing that increasing implementation of re-
view mechanisms in the mental health delivery system is needed).
308. Id.; cf. T. BuTLEr, MENTAL HEALTH, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE LAW 190-201 (1985)
(examining the effects of the English Mental Health Act of 1959 on the administration of
mental health care).
309. If it is possible to detect malingering, then the fact that it has not been detected
in a plaintiff will suggest that the plaintiff is not malingering. See generally S. SMITH & R.
MEYER, supra note 29, at 277-83 (discussing types of malingering and methods of assess-
ment) Rogers, Current Status of Clinical Methods, in CLINICAL Ass.ssEiNr OF MALINGER-
ING 293 (R. Rogers ed. 1988) (detailing current methods of detecting deception). A special
issue on malingering is contained in Malingering and Deception: An Update, 8 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 1-104 (1990).
310. A new treatment for schizophrenia is much more likely to raise liability concerns
if it is a drug than if it is a nonphysical therapy. When Clozaril (clozapine) was recently
released by Sandoz Pharmaceuticals for schizophrenia, the company was so concerned about
liability from the risk of blood abnormalities that it required weekly blood tests by a labora-
tory of its choosing. See N.Y. Times, May 15, 1990, at C2, col. 1. The cost of the drug,
including the tests, will be about $9,000 per patient. Id.
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profession is effective in diagnosing or treating a condition, the
higher are the expectations of good results. Consequently, the pub-
lic may be more inclined to believe that a professional was negli-
gent when treatment fails. On the other hand, the same public per-
ception of a profession's effectiveness increases public esteem for
it, and this esteem may tend to reduce liability. Currently, the
public seems to have a cynical attitude about mental health profes-
sionals. The popular image is somewhat that of a personally troub-
led, ineffective therapist (if not charlatan) who can provide anyone
an excuse for committing any crime. If some version of this im-
age dominates in the 1990s, mental health professionals will not
make particularly sympathetic malpractice defendants.
Perhaps the worst malpractice position for a profession to be
in is to have oversold its ability. The impression of professional
competence may arise from direct claims the profession makes or
from the implicit claim of competence that occurs when it regu-
larly performs some task. Eventually, the public and the legal sys-
tem will hold the profession responsible for accomplishing what it
claims it can do or what it undertakes to do. In short, public ex-
pectations of ability create liability. Obstetricians created the ex-
pectation that with modern medicine they could safely deliver ba-
bies, and as a result, the public came to believe that if a baby was
born with injuries someone must have made a mistake. Mental
health professionals suffered similar liability from the perception
that they were pretty good at predicting dangerousness. After all,
they had been predicting dangerousness in and out of court for
years. It should not have been too surprising that Tarasoff liability
developed based on the theory that, if mental health professionals
"know it when they see it," they ought to protect the rest of us
from it.312 This represents a kind of "petard liability" because the
profession is hoisted on its own claims of expertise. To some de-
gree, this has also occurred in the last couple of decades with sui-
cide prevention: where courts and the public assume that ther-
apists know when someone is at risk for suicide, they expect that
therapists should take effective steps to prevent it.3
311. In cartoons, television shows and movies, mental health professionals (especially
psychiatrists) are now frequently pictured as buffoons, as obsessed with sex, or as California
hottub therapists.
312. Refer to notes 235-66 supra and accompanying text.
313. Refer to notes 337-42 infra and accompanying text (examining professional liabil-
ity for patient suicide). Like predictions of dangerousness to others, mental health experts
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The potential exists for "petard liability" to arise in the 1990s.
For example, expert testimony given by some professionals in rape,
child abuse, and child custody is a possible source of such liabil-
ity.314 The assumption that mental health professionals have spe-
cial expertise in constructing proffles of victims and perpetrators of
such abuse obviously underlies this testimony.3 15 Some mental
health professionals also claim to be able to tell (and to testify)
whether a parent is fit or not and even whether granting custody to
one of two fit parents would be in the best interest of the child.sl
The public or the legal system may come to assume that mental
health professionals really have the expertise to make these deter-
minations. In this event, the 1990s may see malpractice claims ad-
vanced on the basis that professionals failed to detect or report
sexual abuse while briefly treating a child, or failed to detect and
report that a patient matched the "profile" a rapist, child abuser,
testified in civil commitment hearings for years that potentially suicidal patients, because
they were dangerous to themselves, should be committed. This, of course, eventually creates
the impression that mental health experts can tell who is suicidal.
314. Smith, Mental Health Expert Witnesses: Of Science and Crystal Balls, 7 BEIAV.
Sci. & L. 145, 158-61 (1989) (reviewing the use of psychological evidence regarding the bat-
tered wife syndrome, the rape trauma syndrome and the battering parent syndrome); c.
Buchele & Buchele, Legal and Psychological Issues in the Use of Expert Testimony on
Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 26, 37-40 (1985) (describing the role of the
expert and the advantages and disadvantages of using his testimony); Myers, Bays, Becker,
Berliner, Corwin & Saywitz, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NED.
L. REv. 1, 32-105 (1989) (detailing the scientific basis for identifying sexual abuse); Roe,
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIArm L. Ray. 97, 104-13 (1985)
(warning against the use of expert psychiatric testimony to bolster the victim's credibility);
Note, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary
Analysis, 77 Nw. U. L. Rav. 348, 355-73 (1982) (suggesting that evidentiary safeguards are
sufficient to prevent the improper use of battered wife syndrome testimony).
315. Courts will accept scientific evidence only if it has at least a fair acceptance in the
scientific community and will assist the jury. See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv.
414, 417-21 (1952). Therefore, where "syndrome evidence" is admitted, it must mean that
courts admitting such evidence have been convinced that mental health experts have special
ability to determine who abusers are or are likely to be. See id.
316. Hirsch, Expert Witnesses in Child Custody Cases, 19 FABI. L.Q. 207, 215-17
(1985). See generally McCord, Syndromes Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Ap-
proach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases,
66 OR. L. Ray. 19, 27-35 (1987) (examining the characteristics and impact of non-traditional
psychological evidence); Swann, The Dangers of Using Court-Appointed Experts in Child
Custody Cases, 27 JUDGES' J. 16, 18-19 (1988) (recognizing the special problems faced by
court-appointed experts in evaluating their subjects); Note, The Syndrome Syndrome:
Problems Concerning the Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Psychological Profiles, 37
U. FLA. L. REv. 1035, 1054-57 (1985) (emphasizing the importance of evaluating the reliabil-
ity of the testimony rather than determining whether its admission will usurp the role of the
jury).
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or unfit parent.
Some public advertising which portrays drug and alcohol
treatment programs and juvenile hospitalization as a means of
"straightening kids out" may also create unrealistic expectations.
Even though these claims do not rise to the level of warranties,
they may suggest a broad ability to provide treatment which prob-
ably cannot be delivered. This is likely to cause people to conclude
that someone must have done something wrong if the programs do
not work. This perception can expand liability in two ways. First,
it can increase the possibility that the clients of these institutions
will be dissatisfied and bring claims. Second, jurors will view
mental health institutions and professionals with unrealistic expec-
tations about what they should be able to do.
Mental health professionals also may face greater liability ex-
posure in the 1990s because of an increase in the number of pa-
tients a typical therapist sees. Group and short-term therapy in-
creases the patient count, compared with traditional approaches
such as psychoanalysis. The trend has been toward these modes of
therapy.317 In addition, mental health professionals are increas-
ingly involved in activities, for instance, test development and vali-
dation, that may affect dozens of people who are not directly their
clients.318 Those professionals who carelessly undertake these ac-
tivities without thorough training face the possibility of legal expo-
sure to many plaintiffs.
The continued expansion of a mental health bar may also have
an impact. For the first time, there are a significant number of at-
torneys who have experience and training in mental health law and
understand how to pursue mental health issues, including malprac-
tice claims. 1 This group may also educate other plaintiffs' attor-
neys to the possibilities presented by mental health cases. At the
same time, the mental health bar should help reduce malpractice
claims by refusing to take weak cases, providing excellent defense
work, and advising institutions and practitioners on ways of reduc-
ing the risks of malpractice.
On the other side of the interdisciplinary coin, a fair number
of well-trained mental health professionals will be willing to act as
317. See Smith, supra note 307.
318. Refer to notes 131-32 supra and accompanying text
319. Mental health courses have been common in law schools only for a decade or two.
As a result of these courses, a number of law graduates now have had formal exposure to,
and training in, mental health law.
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expert witnesses in malpractice cases. Because plaintiffs, rather
than defendants, traditionally have had trouble securing experts to
testify to questions of standard of care and causation, this develop-
ment will tend to increase plaintiffs' ability to prove malpractice
claims.
As the number of experienced forensic mental health experts
increases, both sides should have access to better mental health
evidence, and this should increase the number of correct malprac-
tice verdicts. Further, a plaintiffs' bar better attuned to mental
health issues should be able to reduce the number of frivolous
claims. Neither result, however, is guaranteed. The mental health
"any-testimony-for-a-buck hired guns" may use their expertise to
make a very weak case seem unfairly strong to a lay jury, 2 O and
the mental health attorney may be able to use his understanding of
mental health to take and make plausible even trivial cases.
A number of legal principles which have become fairly well ac-
cepted during the last fifteen or twenty years will undoubtedly
continue to evolve into standard legal doctrine. This will tend to
increase somewhat the level of malpractice claims. One of the sig-
nificant developments includes the loss of immunities, 21 particu-
larly charitable and governmental immunities. In addition, ex-
panded concepts of vicarious liability and the duty to supervise
have increased institutional liability. 22 Furthermore, the law is los-
ing its 'traditional reluctance to recognize and compensate emo-
tional and psychic injuries.32 3 Also, the claim that suicide is a su-
perseding cause no longer precludes recovery in most instances. 24
Finally, the concept that therapists owe duties to people other
than their clients and the related weakening of the doctrine of lim-
ited duty gave rise to Tarasof.325 The full effect of that duty will
be felt in several states during the 1990s. 328
320. Smith, supra note 314, at 150-51, 177-78.
321. Refer to note 261 supra and accompanying text.
322. Refer to notes 261-77 supra and accompanying text.
323. Refer to notes 33-38 supra and accompanying text.
324. Refer to note 40 supra.
325. Refer to notes 212-31 supra and accompanying text.
326. Although the Tarasoff duty to protect or warn seems to be a broadly accepted
legal principle, many states have not formally adopted it because no case has reached their
supreme courts. Because of the novelty of the theory, it is likely to be several years before
the resulting level of malpractice liability can be judged.
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B. Reducing Liability
Some changes will tend to reduce the level of mental health
malpractice liability. A number of states have enacted tort reform,
or at least malpractice reform, and other states continue to con-
sider such legislation.32 7 Although these reform packages often are
flawed, or even unconstitutional,328 it is possible that some of them
will have at least some impact on mental health malpractice.32 9 For
example, those statutes that put caps on the size of malpractice
recovery could possibly limit verdicts in suicide, duty to protect
(Tarasof), and some medication cases. The Tarasoff statutes330
might also limit malpractice liability somewhat if those statutes
are interpreted as reducing the duty of therapists to protect the
intended victims of their patients. Because most of these statutes
are badly drafted, however, it is unlikely that they will ever have
any significant effect on liability. 3 1
It is also possible that mental health professionals will success-
fully seek specific statutory protection from liability during the
decade. Some of the professions have demonstrated considerable
lobbying strength in state legislatures, and if they made a con-
certed, unified effort to pass such limitations, they might well have
some success. In the past, states have sometimes granted immunity
from liability to mental health professionals, but this has generally
been done to encourage participation in government or the legal
system (e.g., civil commitment). If the experience with the
Tarasoff statutes is any indication, however, other groups, such as
trial lawyers, will match mental health lobbying efforts. In this
event, the resulting statute would be so weak or muddled that few
real changes in liability would occur. 2
Common-law liability will probably not change dramatically
during this decade. Courts will not plow significant new ground in
establishing mental health liability as they have done in the last
couple of decades; it is equally unlikely that there will be a dra-
327. Refer to notes 370-81 infra and accompanying text.
328. Refer to note 248 supra and accompanying text.
329. Many of the general medical reforms may have somewhat limited impact on
mental health professionals. For example, if the reform applies to claims against physicians,
only psychiatrists among all mental health professionals would be affected.
330. Refer to note 234 supra.
331. Refer to notes 243-47 supra and accompanying text.
332. Id.
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matic retreat from liability.33 3 There has been sufficient reaction
against the expansion of liability of the last twenty years that
many courts now seem reluctant to continue to implement new
theories of liability. At the same time, there is little evidence that
courts are rejecting the liability doctrines developed in the last two
decades. For example, it is highly unlikely that strict liability will
be expanded to include services such as psychotherapy or to cover
the prescription, as opposed to the manufacture, of drugs. The fact
that states have formally adopted some generally accepted com-
mon-law doctrines (such as Tarasoff) may give the impression that
the common-law liability is expanding. However, this represents a
consolidation of principles developed in the 1970s and 1980s, not
expansion of liability into new areas.
The Supreme Court has both expanded and contracted section
1983 liability in mental health law. It has applied that liability to
areas of mental health practice,'I while at the same time providing
a broad range of defenses. 3 5 For example, the Court has tended to
rely on the professional judgment of mental health professionals at
least as long as they are operating within reasonable medical and
mental health expertise.3 The Court's current position makes it
unlikely that section 1983 cases will significantly increase malprac-
tice liability during the 1990s.
333. The Tarasoff-type liability, increased recognition of mental distress as deserving
compensation (even without physical injury), and the expanded vicarious liability of institu-
tions are examples of tort law expansion that are not likely to be eliminated during the
1990s.
334. E.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 987-90 (1990) (state facility's failure to
ascertain competence of patient admitted as voluntary held sufficient to state a § 1983
claim); City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204-07 (1989) (recognizing the inadequacy
of police training to deal with mentally ill prisoners as a basis for § 1983 municipal liability
only where it amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights); O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U. S. 563, 573-76 (1975) (holding that a state cannot constitutionally confine
without treatment a non-dangerous individual who can survive safely in freedom).
335. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (defendant must have vio-
lated a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right"); Youngberg v. Romeo, 467
U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982) (good faith exception to liability, defendant must have shown sub-
stantial departure from professional judgment); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967)
(establishing good faith exception).
336. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1040-44 (1990) (using mental health pro-
fessionals to decide whether to medicate a mentally ill prisoner held to comply with proce-
dural due process); Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982) (holding that courts
must defer to the judgment of qualified professionals in determining what level of training is
reasonable for involuntarily committed patients); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-13
(1979) (using a medical decision making process to determine whether children under 18
should be committed to state hospitals held to comply with due process).
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Other changes may help to lower malpractice by reducing the
incidence of harm from bad mental health practice. Insurance car-
riers and practitioners themselves will undoubtedly respond to in-
creasing malpractice premiums by paying closer attention to the
areas of practice and practitioners that account for the risk of lia-
bility. This will probably mean that many mental health institu-
tions will begin more carefully to review the work of professional
employees and those with practice privileges. Insurance carriers
will increasingly offer educational and other risk-reduction pro-
grams. Malpractice insurance carriers will exclude professionally
unacceptable activities from coverage, thereby providing an added
incentive for practitioners to avoid these practices. It is possible,
but unlikely, that increasing malpractice claims will encourage the
mental health professions to use the licensure process more effec-
tively in order to eliminate the incompetent or unethical
practitioner.
As noted above, the development of standards of acceptable
practice for treating emotional conditions may tend to increase lia-
bility by helping establish provable standards of care. The same
process also clearly could inform practitioners of practices that
they should avoid. In the end, treatment standards can help reduce
the level of malpractice by discouraging the use of outdated, im-
practical, and useless therapies and techniques. These standards
may thus reduce the level of malpractice by improving the overall
quality of practice.
C. Malpractice Directions
The factors that will contribute to increases in malpractice lia-
bility for mental health professionals and institutions during the
1990s are almost entirely unrelated to changes in the law. Indeed,
any significant legal changes will most likely result from statutory
efforts to reduce liability. It is changes in the nature of practice
and, ironically, progress in mental health research that probably
result in the increased liability.
By considering the factors working to change the level of mal-
practice during the 1990s, it is possible to predict which areas of
mental health activity will be sources of increased liability.' I
337. X PERLN, supra note 7, at 34, 47-48, 57, 69, 72, 84, 115 (suggesting a number of
areas in which mental health liability is likely to increase, including sexual misconduct,
ECT, suicide, unconventional therapy, wrongful confinement, informed consent and confi-
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predict the following ten areas will have more malpractice claims
by the end of the decade: s (1) Negligent diagnosis and treatment
that deviates from accepted treatment patterns (unless there has
been special informed consent to nonstandard treatment);339 (2)
failure to prevent suicide;S 0 (3) inappropriate prescription of drugs
and failure of informed consent;3 41 (4) Tarasoff-type liability;3 4 2 (5)
inadequate test development and validation; 4 (6) institutional vi-
carious liability;3 44 (7) breach of confidentiality;3 45 (8) sexual ex-
ploitation of patients;3 48 (9) failure of institutions to supervise pro-
fessional staff and those in training;347 and (10) failure to detect
and report child and elder abuse.48
dentiality); J. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 5 (predicting an "avalanche" of claims and a
resultant "crisis"); J. SMITH, supra note 7, at 12 (suggesting that "the days of relative immu-
nity are definitely over").
338. Anyone can play the prediction game. Players may send entries to the author.
339. Refer to notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text. The development of more
standard treatment may increase liability. Refer to notes 154-56 supra and accompanying
text.
340. Refer to notes 83-89 supra and accompanying text.
341. The prescription of drugs may create physical injuries that are easily proved.
Furthermore, it is likely that drugs will be used increasingly. Refer to notes 96-98 and 193
supra and accompanying text.
342. Refer to notes 212-48 supra and accompanying text. Tarasoff liability continues
to be adopted by states. Refer to notes 231 and 234 supra and accompanying text. This
increased acceptance of the duty to protect will probably lead to greater liability.
343. Refer to notes 150-53 and 283 supra and accompanying text. Federal laws regard-
ing employment and educational testing have resulted in mental health professionals being
significantly involved in test development. Refer to note 150 supra and accompanying text.
Liability in this area is only beginning to develop. Refer to notes 151-53 supra and accom-
panying text.
344. Refer to notes 269-76 supra and accompanying text.
345. Refer to notes 122-30 supra and accompanying text. Although the mental health
profession perceives confidentiality as essential for successful therapy, there are increasing
pressures to release information obtained during therapy. Refer to note 231 supra and ac-
companying text. These conflicting requirements of confidentiality and the release of infor-
mation from therapy will pose real dilemmas for therapists.
346. Refer to notes 104-16 supra and accompanying test. Sexual contact that causes
injury subjects a therapist to liability. I expect that sexual contact liability will have a sig-
nificant impact during the early years of the decade. Malpractice carriers increasingly refuse
to cover sexual contact with patients. Refer to note 113 supra and accompanying text.
347. Refer to notes 265-68 supra and accompanying text. During the last two decades,
a trend toward expecting health institutions to more carefully select and supervise their
employees and others who work in the facilities has developed. Refer to notes 267-68 supra
and accompanying text. Ostensible agency also imposes greater liability. Refer to notes 274-
75 supra and accompanying text.
348. Refer to notes 249-60 supra and accompanying text. Both statutory and common
law liability exist for failure to report child abuse. Refer to note 249 supra and accompany-
ing text. This basis for liability has developed slowly, but given the amount of unreported
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In contrast, there are several areas in which I do not predict
increase in liability. These include (1) electroconvulsive therapy;'o
(2) wrongful involuntary commitment;3 50 (3) defamation;351 (4) sec-
tion 1983 liability;352 (5) testimony as expert witnesses,1 3 and (6)
forcible administration of medications.3 '
VIII AN AGENDA FOR MALPRACTICE REFORMS IN THE 1990s
A. Problems with the Current System
Serious problems exist with the current mental health mal-
practice system. The system is slow, expensive, imprecise, im-
mensely time consuming, threatening, and embarrassing; it creates
great stress on plaintiffs and defendants alike and relies on lay ju-
ries-to settle complex scientific questions and to define the stan-
dard of care. 55 Of course, many of these criticisms have been di-
abuse, it potentially represents a significant source of liability. Refer to note 258 supra and
accompanying text.
349. Mental health professionals will probably use ECT less frequently and conduct it
move safely. Moreover, institutions will monitor its use more closely. Refer to notes 90-95
supra and accompanying text.
350. States generally provide immunity for good faith participation in the involuntary
commitment process. If anything, the Supreme Court is making it more likely that volun-
tary rather than involuntary treatment will be subject to liability. Refer to notes 13449
supra and accompanying text.
351. The first amendment and common law protections make most mental health pro-
fessionals' defamatory comments subject to at least a qualified privilege.
352. The expansion and contraction of § 1983 liability should make this source of lia-
bility a wash, with liability remaining at present levels. Refer to notes 13841 supra and
accompanying text.
353. Mental health professionals will appear with increased frequency in courts as ex-
pert witnesses during the 1990s. However, states generally grant immunity for such testi-
mony, unless it is perjured. Refer to note 314 supra and accompanying text.
354. The right to refuse treatment is unlikely to expand during the 19903. Further-
more, procedures for forcing medicine are increasingly well defined.
355. See, e.g., S. CHARLES & K KNNmY, DEmsNN. A PsvcaCATaisT ON TAi. FR
MAIDicAL MALPRAcrxcE 210-24 (1985) (exploring the chilling effect on the practices of those
physicians threatened by malpractice claims); Shapiro, Book Review, 31 N.Y.L. Sc. L REy.
867, 867 (1986) (refusing to find the legal profession at fault for the medical malpractice
crisis). See generally US. DEP'T. OF HEAxTH & Huum Says., REPORT OF TH TAsK FoRcE
ON M ICAL LABMnrY AND MAiRACTnC (1987) (giving comprehensive analyais of medical
liability and malpractice); P. DANZON, supra note 18, at 5 (giving an economic analysis of
existing system and proposals for change); J. KAmm & N. PAmC CosTs AND CoMPENSATIoN
PAID IN ToRT LITIGATION vii-xii (1986) (setting forth empirical evidence regarding the costs
of tort litigation); Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments
and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAvis L Ray. 499, 506-07 (1939) (discussing de-
fendants' complaints about tort reforms in medical malpractice); Robinson, The Medical
Malpractice Crisis of the 1970s: A Retrospective, 49 L & CoNTami. Pnons. 5, 5-18 (1986)
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rected at the tort system generally, and other problems are
common to most health malpractice claims.s5 ' However, the mal-
practice system in mental health cases creates special problems.
Confidentiality and the obligation to maintain patient secrets
have been hallmarks of the mental health professions. These pro-
fessions have stressed that confidentiality is essential to successful
therapy and to patient well being.356 The spectacle of patient
secrets being revealed publicly as a result of a malpractice case is
inconsistent with the goals of the mental health professions. Psy-
chotherapy requires that patients reveal the most sensitive infor-
mation about themselves and their families."' Patients often dis-
close information that they would not tell anyone else. Therapy
deals not only with factual information that can be embarrassing,
but also with the most intimate fantasies, fears, and anxieties. In
short, mental health malpractice cases will reveal information sur-
rounding the most private details of the patient's life. In the de-
bate over testimonial privileges, there has been broad agreement
that a psychotherapist-patient privilege is justified5 " even though
a general medical or health care privilege is not.359
The public nature of malpractice cases means that the pa-
tient's extremely personal information will not be revealed in cam-
(reviewing the causes of medical malpractice in the 1970s).
355.1 For a recent review of problems with the current medical malpractice system
and the advantages of non-litigation resolution of injuries, see Hutkin, Resolving the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis: Alternatives to Litigation, 4 JJL. & HEALTH 21, 32-54 (1989-90).
356. See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960) ("There is wide agree-
ment that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment. . . . A
threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment."). All mental health professions include in
their code of ethics a confidentiality provision. Refer to note 100 supra (citations to various
confidentiality provisions). Several studies have considered the importance of confidentiality
from a utilitarian perspective with somewhat mixed results. See, e.g., Shuman & Weiner,
The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60
N.C.L. REv. 893, 926 (1982) (concluding that confidentiality is required for building trust);
Smith, supra note 44, at 547-49 (asserting that current statutes do not adequately support
confidentiality in psychotherapy).
357. Smith, supra note 43, at 25-30, 52.
358. See, e.g., Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 504, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-
41 (1972) (providing for a psychotherapist-patient privilege); J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVI-
DENCE §§ 2285, 2380a (J. McNaughton ed. 1961 & Supp. 1988) (discussing general principles
and policies behind privileges); Smith, supra note 44, at 546-49 (asserting the importance of
protecting confidentiality through a privilege).
359. See Smith, supra note 44, at 546-49 (arguing that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is justified because psychotherapy information is more sensitive than medical in-
formation and psychotherapy usually relies more on free self disclosure).
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era, but will be available to others. Not only will the information
elicited at trial be disclosed, but considerably more information
will be revealed during the discovery process. The breadth of dis-
covery in civil cases leaves little information about the mental
health of the patient beyond inspection.3 80 Additionally, discovery
is not limited to information held by the mental health profes-
sional against whom the malpractice case is filed. The plaintiff's
mental condition before seeing the professional may be relevant to
determine whether malpractice caused the injury. Therefore, much
of the information from prior psychotherapy is probably relevant
and discoverable. Furthermore, the mental health and treatment of
the patient subsequent to any malpractice is usually relevant to
the question of damages, so information from that subsequent
treatment probably will be discoverable. Thus, virtually the entire
mental health history of the plaintiff may be revealed during the
mental health malpractice case.3 1
The foregoing discussion illustrates the difficulty facing an in-
jured patient who has been harmed by a therapist's actionable
breach of confidentiality. To pursue such legal claims, plaintiffs
must undertake lawsuits which will inevitably require that they
publicly reveal considerably more about their emotional conditions
than their negligent therapists ever revealed. Thus, ironically, the
patients' lawsuits probably will excerbate the very harm for which
they seek compensation.
Psychotherapist-patient privileges 6 2 will not protect the pa-
tient's sensitive information during a malpractice case. The pa-
tient-litigant exception38s destroys the privilege because the plain-
360. See Slovenko, supra note 44, at 649. The very nature of discovery is to allow
fishing expeditions to determine what information may be relevant at trial. The discovery
process, therefore, results in the examination of much more information than will be actu-
ally used at trial See id. It is often very difficult to ensure that information requested in
discovery is relevant until after it has been released to the opposing party. See id. Thus, the
discovery exceptions to the privilege have left little or no protection for the psychotherapist-
patient relationship. Id.
361. Id.; See Smith, supra note 43, at 52.
362. The psychotherapist-patient privilege allows patients to avoid judicial disclosure
of their communications with psychotherapists. Smith, supra note 44, at 515. Almost all
psychotherapist-patient privileges are statutory, although a few have constitutional or com-
mon law bases. Smith, supra note 314, at 158-61.
363. A patient waives the patient-litigant privilege when she brings her own mental
condition into question. Smith, supra note 43, at 52-53. Courts have universally accepted
the exception to avoid the unfairness of allowing a person who raises mental condition que3-
tions to hide behind the privilege in order to prevent opposing parties from obtaining the
information necessary to challenge the claims. Id.
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tiff brings his or her own mental conditions into question by filing
the suit.3" While there has been an interesting proposal to limit
the patient-litigant exception to clearly relevant information re-
vealed in therapy,8 5 it has not been adopted. Thus, a potential
malpractice plaintiff faces the unhappy choice of giving up a po-
tentially legitimate claim for damages or agreeing to reveal large
amounts of very sensitive personal information.
Plaintiffs who bring mental health malpractice claims often
must relive publicly their most troubling experiences. Like the
rape victim who is forced to confront the attacker, describe pub-
licly the experience, and (in days past) disclose prior sexual his-
tory,66 injured mental health malpractice plaintiffs must agree to
have the most private aspects of their lives examined, explained,
attacked, and viewed in public.36 7 Furthermore, the plaintiffs who
undertake this emotionally difficult process are people whose emo-
tional difficulty and fragility probably caused them to seek psycho-
therapy in the first place.
Attorneys representing mental health plaintiffs often appear
insensitive to the harm and pain that vigorously pursuing a mental
health claim may cause the plaintiff. The plaintiff may be harmed
by the emotional stress of prolonged proceedings, the release of
private information, and the need to confront a formerly inti-
364. In a few mental health malpractice situations the patient-litigant exception would
not necessarily result in the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Generally,
waiver would not occur when someone other than the patient was injured, notably in
Tarasoff-type cases. In those instances, the opposing party may still be able to obtain the
therapy information, if, for example, the patient waived the privilege, or the state recog-
nized a future crime exception to the privilege. See Note, The Future Crime or Dangerous-
ness Exceptions to Communications Privileges, 77 HARv. L. Ray. 730, 733 (1964); Note, Psy-
chiatrist-Patient Privilege: A Need for the Retention of the Future Crime Exception, 52
IOWA L. REv. 1170, 1182-85 (1967).
365. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufatedler, J. con-
curring and dissenting), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). Judge Hufstedler suggested that
to avoid unnecessary invasions of privacy, the patient-litigant exception should be limited to
permitting the opposing party to discover the time, length, cost and ultimate diagnosis of
treatment. The discovering party could then obtain additional information only if by dem-
onstrating a compelling need for it. Id.
366. See generally S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VicTiM 198-99
(1979); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
CoLuh. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1977); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the
Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 548 (1980).
367. The patient will probably be required to confront the therapist, in whom great
trust was placed and who had an emotional intimacy with the patient. The patient will have
to reveal the details of that relationship. Furthermore, the patient may also be required to
detail prior mental health history.
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mately trusted mental health professional. The standard personal
injury approach may promote the legal interests of the plaintiff in
a technical sense while seriously harming the person's general wel-
fare. In many cases, the overall interests of clients may be better
served with a little less legal due process in exchange for a faster
and less public resolution of mental health disputes. Mental health
malpractice litigation does not produce a sense of justice and com-
passion, nor is it consistent with the goals and values of the mental
health or legal professions.
In addition to the special problems of patient confidentiality,
the mental health malpractice system poses a number of other dif-
ficulties. These include establishing the appropriate standard of
care, determining causation, and accurately assessing damages.3' s
These problems mean that a wide range of evidence may be rele-
vant or necessary. In addition, expert testimony is a complication
because the various approaches and schools of thought result in
widely divergent expert opinions.6 9 Lay juries, therefore, are asked
to make extremely complex mental health decisions based on be-
wildering advice and testimony regarding the cause and extent of
emotional harm.
B. Reform Proposals
In addressing problems with the current system of health care
malpractice, commentators have suggested creative reforms rang-
ing from technical improvements in the current systems7" to major
changes that include no fault.3 71 Even major reforms would resolve
368. Refer to notes 23-31 supra and accompanying text.
369. Smith, supra note 314, at 150.
370. See, e.g., Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14 BEL. J.
ECON. 213 (1983); Wexler & Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in
Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BMav. ScL & L
485, 501-04 (1989) (suggesting changes to correct juror hindsight bias).
371. See, e.g., Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Con-
tractual Foundation for Medical Services, 49 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 201, 201 (1986) (dis:
cussing contractual allocation of medical malpractice rishs between doctor and patient);
Herzog, The Reform of Medical Liability: Tort Law or Insurance?, 38 A. J. Com. L 99,
107-13 (1990) (reviewing "radical" proposals for change); O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Reme-
dies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49 LAw &
CoNTma. PROBS. 125, 127 (1986) (recommending a no fault system through legislative and
contractual reform); Starr, The No-Fault Alternative to Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Compensation, Deterrence and Viability Aspects of a Patient Compensation Scheme, 20
Tx TECH L Rzv. 803, 826-37 (modification of the current system is more desirable than a
no-fault system); Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 LAw & Coz'rmsp. PnoBs
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only some of the problems with the current system. Fault-based
systems require some way of determining a standard of care as well
as causation and damages.7 2
No fault, strict liability, and the like eliminate fault determi-
nations, but they still are causation-based and therefore require
that compensable events be identified.3 78 Because the major advan-
tage of these programs is the reduction in transaction costs, the
compensable events must be capable of easy determination. Estab-
lishing causation, however, is* a major problem in many mental
health cases. Determining when injuries are caused by an automo-
bile accident is relatively easy; when they are caused by medical
care, more difficult; when they are caused by mental health care,
extremely difficult. Since almost all reform proposals are causa-
tion-based, the substantial transaction costs in mental health cases
would remain because of the difficulty in determining causation
and damages. 74 Furthermore, most reforms would not protect
plaintiff's privacy in a mental health malpractice action.
Other reform proposals regarding damages in personal injury
(particularly malpractice) cases have included placing caps on total
damages or noneconomic damages, establishing schedules of dam-
ages for specific injuries as in workers' compensation, and reducing
damages by providing offsets against actual damages (e.g., by elim-
277, 285-86 (1986) (advocating a no-fault system).
372. Fault systems require that the trier of fact determine whether the party causing
an injurious event was at fault. In negligence this determination is that of duty and breach.
373. No fault and strict liability relieve the trier of fact from determining whether
one party or another breached a standard of care (i.e., was at fault). However, the fact that
someone did not come out of treatment "well" or "whole" does not mean that the patient
should receive compensation. Only if the treatment caused the injury does the patient re-
ceive compensation. Thus, causation must be established to determine whether there has
been a compensable event.
374. A no fault plan or other causation based system depends on the presence of some
clear event that triggers payment. The purpose of such a system is to eliminate expensive
arguments over whether the injury resulted from fault. However, it is meant to compensate
injuries caused by an activity (e.g., driving a car, medical treatment or psychotherapy).
Compensation is intended not for every broken arm that someone who drives a car suffers,
only those broken arms caused by car accidents. Similarly, a mental health no fault system
is not designed to cover all neurotic reactions, only those that are caused by the therapy.
The difficulty is determining whether therapy caused certain injuries. See generally Keeton,
Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 616 (1973) (arguing that no
fault automobile insurance in the field of medical malpractice would not lower transaction
costs). Although there have been a number of creative efforts to solve this it remains a
problem. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABrry, DESIGNED COMPENSA-
BLE EvENr SysTEm. A FEssmimrry STUDY (1979).
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inating the collateral source rule).,75 Other reforms proposed by
commentators aim to reduce malpractice claims by making it more
difficult for plaintiffs to have the substance of their claims
heard.37 6 Still other proposals seek to eliminate res ipsa loquitur
and redefine informed consent and are largely ineffective efforts to
reduce successful claims under the mistaken belief that these legal
doctrines are responsible for significant liability. 7
Some reformers would change the decision maker in malprac-
tice cases by replacing the jury with judges, admini trative panels,
"blue ribbon" (or expert) juries, or arbitrators.3 78 These proposals
differ from the other proposed reforms in that they do not necessa-
rily seek to change the substantive law of liability and damages.
The reforms reflect dissatisfaction in several areas: concern about
asking lay jurors to resolve difficult medical, scientific, and profes-
sional questions; a feeling that jurors' sympathy for the plaintiff
results in unfair findings of liability and excessive damages; and a
fear that expert witnesses may easily mislead lay juries.3 " In
mental health cases, such concerns are particularly great because
the mental health sciences are so imprecise that jurors are left con-
375. See generally Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CALF. L. Rxv. 772, 809 (1985) (proposal for allowing general damages only to punish the
morally blameworthy or to encourage primary cost avoidance); Johnson, Phillip3, Oren-
tlicher & Hattie, A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Mal-
practice Claims, 42 VAND. L REv. 1365, 1367 (1989) (discussing the AMA proposal for re-
forming malpractice also endorsed by the American Psychiatric Association and other
groups).
376. See Robinson, supra note 355, at 21-23 (recommending that courts limit or elimi-
nate the discovery rule to limit the statute of limitations).
377. See generally Bovbjerg, supra note 355, at 511-55 (reviewing the various reform
efforts); U.S. Gov'T GEN. Accr. OFF. supra note 248, at 2-5 (considering several reform ef-
forts); Robinson, supra note 355, at 19-31 (reviewing what reforms of the 1970's
accomplished).
378. See, e.g., Daughtrey & Smith, Medical Malpractice Review Panels in Operation
in Virginia, 19 U. RIcH. L REv. 273, 274-75 (1985) (discussing medical screening panels in
Virginia); Ladimer, Solomon & Mulvihill, Experience in Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 2
J. LEGAL MED. 433, 434-35 (1981) (analyzing arbitration of medical malpractice claims);
Macchiaroll, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure
Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L Rxv. 181, 239-52 (1990) (supporting modified panels and
suggesting a statute to eliminate defects in existing plans); cf. Soble, A Proposal for the
Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14
HARv. J. ON LEGis. 683, 687 (1977) (proposing a Model Act to compensate victims of toxic
pollution outside the present tort law system).
379. See US. DEP'T OF JusTicE, REPORT OF THE POLICY WORKWo GROUP ON THE
CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY biLICATIONS OF THE CuSURENT CiuSIs IN IsuR zcn AvAB.ABArI
AND AFFORDABmTY 63 (1986); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation
and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. Rxv. 774, 778 (1967).
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fused by the range of testimony.
C. Reforms for the 1990s
A just and compassionate system to review mental health mal-
practice claims should strive to (1) increase protection of patient
privacy; (2) conclude claims more quickly and efficiently; (3) pro-
mote consistent and predictable resolution of claims; (4) assure
that decisions conform to announced legal principles and the best
available science; and (5) encourage mental health practitioners to
engage in high quality and ethical practice. The current system of
public trials clearly does not succeed in meeting these goals in
many cases. Because of the problems of the civil trial system in
mental health malpractice cases, optional forums such as investiga-
tive panels and binding arbitration should be available to the in-
jured mental health patient.380
Some potential malpractice claims could be handled more ap-
propriately if the professions themselves took more active respon-
sibility for helping to compensate those who are injured3801 The
professions might establish professional compensation funds to
which those injured by the serious misconduct of a member of the
profession could apply for assistance. 81 An interdisciplinary panel
composed of mental health professionals, attorneys, and others
would investigate cases and then determine what compensation or
restitution was appropriate.382 Such an approach is distinguished
380. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 379, at 778 (arguing that the current system
amounts to an immoral lottery and suggesting a system of nonscheduled social insurance
and selective reimbursement).
380.1 For a review of using alternatives to litigation to resolve health care malpractice,
see Note, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Needed Medicine to
Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 J. DispuTE RESOLUTION 65 (1988).
381. The AMA and American Psychiatric Association have endorsed a plan to move
malpractice claims to an administrative agency somewhat like the panel this article pro-
poses. See Johnson, Phillips, Orentlichner & Hattie, supra note 375, at 1367, 1379. A critical
difference is the AMA proposal would preclude a patient from taking a claim to court. Id.
The patient's option to choose the panel instead of the court is of central importance to the
plan suggested in this article.
382. Each panel would have to have at least one mental health professional to help
interpret the scientific data and an attorney to help ensure that the law is understood and
followed by the panel. Obviously, creating a cadre of mental health professionals who would
have the confidence of patients would be critical. Patients should be allowed to strike unac-
ceptable professionals from the panel. A third member of the team might be a patient advo-
cate to remove concern that the mental health professional would have a no-liability, low
damages bias.
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from other proposals that would make such panels mandatory. 383
This proposal is to use panels solely at the option of the plaintiff
for the same reasons that the confidentiality of therapy exists at
the option of the patient-it is the patient's personal information
that requires protection.
Ideally, patients should not be required to have attorneys re-
quest that a panel undertake an investigation and payment of a
legitimate claim. In addition, such claims and the information dis-
covered in the investigations would remain confidential. This pro-
cess would permit injured patients the option of seeing compensa-
tion without having to resort to the tort system. They could
exercise this option any time before trial. Such professional com-
pensation funds could operate as a voluntary function of the pro-
fession or, in the alternative, as a required part of the licensing
process. Because mental health cases pose such great risks to per-
sonal privacy, a stronger argument exists for patients to have the
option of choosing such panels in mental health cases than in any
other area of litigation.
The funding for such programs could be established in several
ways. A fee paid as part of licensure or membership in a profes-
sional organization would be one way. Another option would be to
tie the compensation to the malpractice system and fund it
through the malpractice carriers. Under this approach, the patient
who opted to accept an award from the fund would do so in lieu of
other malpractice recovery for the injury. Any recovery against a
practitioner could be satisfied with insurance payments (or per-
sonal assets). The fund should also cover uninsured and judgment-
proof practitioners.
Unless the profession voluntarily decided to permit a more
generous standard for recovery, substantive tort law would be
used. However, the method of investigating and proving negli-
gence, causation, and damages would vary considerably from the
current system. The system would protect patient confidentiality
and, at the same time, work more quickly and efficiently. It should
also be able to apply the best available science in resolving cases.
Mental health patients should also have binding arbitration
available as an additional nonjudicial option with which to pursue
mental health malpractice claims. Thus, as a matter of legal right,
383. See, e.g., Johnson, Phillips, Orentlicher & Hattie, supra note 375, at 1379 (pro-
posing mandatory panel for deciding malpractice claims).
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injured patients would have the option (again, even over the objec-
tions of the mental health professional) of either binding arbitra-
tion or the special investigative panel described above as an alter-
native to a civil lawsuit against mental health professionals. No
mental health professional or institution would be permitted to re-
quire that a patient agree, prior to an injury, to use the panel to
resolve any claims or to enter into a binding contract limiting the
patient's choice of forum. The arbitration panel would follow the
rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and apply
substantive tort law; 8 4 the investigative panel would follow the ap-
proach outlined above. In either case, all parties would be required
to maintain the confidentiality of the patient and of the proceed-
ings. Arbitration is essentially an adversarial system, so most pa-
tients would need attorneys to represent them. Furthermore, pre-
sumably some limited discovery process would be required. Either
approach should move comparably more quickly and efficiently
and make better use of mental health science than does the cur-
rent malpractice system.
Neither malpractice arbitration nor an investigative panel is
an original concept, 85 but the argument for using them in mental
health malpractice cases is particularly compelling because of the
extraordinary need to protect patient privacy in those cases. The
absolutely voluntary option given to the plaintiff to choose arbitra-
tion, investigative panel, or civil trial is a critical aspect of the
proposal.
Despite the protection the proposal would give patient pri-
vacy, a number of objections could be raised to it. It removes cases
from the sunshine of public view, bypasses the jury, compromises
the right to appeal, and puts too much trust in the professions to
"guard the hen house. 38 6 In addition, some commentators might
384. Heintz, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Viable Alternative, 34 ARn. J. 12, 13-
14 (1979) (reviewing Southern California Arbitration Project); Ladimer, Solomon & Mulvi-
hill, supra note 378, at 444-47 (reviewing closed case analysis conducted by the Research
Institute of the AAA); Note, Arbitration: An Antidote to New York's Medical Malpractice
Crisis 11 VT. L REv. 577, 585-86 (1986) (reviewing New York's Medical Malpractice Panel);
Note, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Needed Medicine to
Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 J. DisPUTE REs. 65 (1988).
385. Refer to note 378 supra and accompanying text.
386. See S. GROSS, OF FoxEs AND HENHOUSES: LICENSING AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS
14-15 (1984) (claiming that professional self-licensing has caused subversion of public inter-
ests). The same fear could be raised to the investigative and arbitration panels if they were
controlled excessively by mental health professionals.
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suggest the following: That the panels are less likely to be sympa-
thetic to plaintiffs; that they would not work well for some mental
health malpractice cases (such as faulty test development and
Tarasoff-type cases in which the plaintiff is not the patient); that
plaintiffs should have their days in court; that no plaintiff would
choose these options; and that all of the options are the plaintiff's
while the defendant has none. 87
It is true that these proposals would remove some cases from
public view. Indeed, the primary purpose is to resolve claims while
protecting the privacy of the patient s" However, the usual civil
trial remains available for the plaintiff who prefers to be heard in
public. A large number of cases in the labor and commercial areas
are considered confidentially in arbitration, and many other cases
are negotiated to settlement outside public view and scrutiny. A
narrow confidentiality exception legitimately should be made to al-
low reporting to licensing and credentialing authorities; this would
help remove the incompetent and unethical therapists from prac-
tice ss9 The right to appeal is commonly limited in arbitration cases
to help promote the goals of quick and confidential resolution of
disputes, and this has not created impossible obstacles.
While the jury has many advantages, in the complex areas of
establishing standards of mental health care, causation, and dam-
ages, experts may have considerable advantage over juries.33 0 Addi-
tionally, plaintiffs who believe that their cases were not appropri-
ate for an arbitration or investigation panel would utilize the usual
civil jury system. At the same time, those plaintiffs who do not
387. See, e.g., Interview with Thomas Demetrio (1988), reprinted in A.BA. J, Mar.
1988, at 49 (comments by a noted trial lawyer discussing the reluctance of the plaintiffs' bar
to embrace alternative malpractice approaches).
388. Refer to notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
389. Patients and patients' rights advocates increasingly have voiced concern about
the need to identify and remove incompetent practitioners. Central registries of disciplinary
actions by institutions, license suspensions and revocations, and malpractice claims may
prove to be important tools for improving identification and removal efforts. The optional
panels suggested here should have the authority to report the outcome of any hearing be-
cause the panels would use fault concepts. If the funds paid to plaintiffs were tied to mal-
practice insurance, those payments would certainly be reportable.
390. Experts are likely to be able to consider more carefully the content of scientific
evidence, and as well as identify any claim or testimony that exceeds the bounds of good
science. Experts, however, may be too sympathetic toward the fellow professional ("There,
but for the grace of God, go r"). Moreover, the expert as decision maker may impose his own
school of thought on any controversies. Selection of the experts who make up the panels,
and clear statements of their obligations and of the law, therefore, would be critical. The
presence of an attorney on the panels would also help with these problems.
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want their "day in court" because it is too public should not be
required to have it, they should have a less public option. The op-
tion may incidentally benefit mental health professionals who
would prefer that any malpractice claims against them be handled
as quietly and quickly as possible.
The conventional wisdom suggests that panels and arbitrators
are less sympathetic to plaintiffs, or at least give lower awards,
than juries. Although plaintiffs as a group have not done that well
in jury trials in mental health cases,39 1 it is probably true that in
some cases (particularly where there has been outrageous conduct
or grievous injury) juries may give higher awards. In those cases,
plaintiffs could choose the usual civil jury trial. More importantly,
however, plaintiffs could rationally choose a nonjury option even
assuming it meant the possibility of a lower award. The benefits of
maintaining the privacy of their mental health information and the
ability to quickly conclude the claim in a less threatening environ-
ment may well outweigh the chance of a higher economic award.
Furthermore, from the plaintiff's perspective, the efficiencies of the
options may reduce the total costs of pursuing a claim and offset
some of the possible economic disadvantages of the informal
mechanism.
Conventional wisdom often causes plaintiffs' attorneys to ob-
ject to nonjury determinations of liability and damages. They
might, therefore, be expected to advise many plaintiffs not to opt
for the arbitration or investigative panel. However, in mental
health cases, this may be bad advice in light of the total interests
of the plaintiff, as opposed to the plaintiff's interest in wringing
every last dollar out of a case. As a sophisticated mental health bar
develops, perhaps it will become more sensitive to the harm that
mental health malpractice plaintiffs can suffer from the process of
preparing for and going through a regular public trial.
The optional arbitration and investigative panels are impor-
tant beyond the protection of confidentiality that they can provide.
They also allow informal procedures and rules of evidence, more
sophisticated use of expert witnesses (including experts not ap-
pointed by either party),9 2 and the efficiency and speed noted
391. See, e.g., J. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 5 (maintaining that the majority of
mental health malpractice claims result in favorable verdicts for the defendant).
392. The more effective use of expert witnesses and the reduction in the use of margi-
nal scientific evidence could be a very significant advantage for these panels. While federal
courts may appoint "impartial" experts (FED. R. Evm. 706), they seldom exercise this power.
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above. Because they are optional with the patient any time before
trial, they should avoid many of the constitutional difficulties that
have developed with medical malpractice reforms.0
In all likelihood, these optional forums would not effect signif-
icantly the goal of improving the quality of mental health practice.
The deterrent effect of the tort law in malpractice cases probably
would not be changed greatly.2" Other efforts to improve the qual-
ity of professional services will be essential 9 5 Like all professions,
the mental health professions could reduce the number and sever-
ity of injuries if the licensing and credentialling processes were
used more effectively to detect and eliminate the unethical and in-
competent practitioners. Ultimately, significant reductions in inju-
ries from therapy will depend on determining what kinds of ther-
apy are effective for what conditions, and which practitioners are
adequately trained and qualified to provide the services they
render.
IX. CONCLUSION
The last two decades have seen significant increases in num-
bers and size of malpractice claims against mental health practi-
tioners and the institutions in which they work. Indications are
that this trend will continue during the 1990s as the standard of
care in the mental health professions is more carefully defined, as
research helps identify the causes of some emotional harm, and as
a sophisticated mental health bar develops.
The real challenge for the next decade is to find ways of avoid-
ing the serious problems that the current torts system presents in
considering mental health malpractice cases. Giving injured pa-
T. WMLGING. CouRT-ApponTrD ExPRTms (1986) (Federal Judicial Center paper).
393. Refer to note 248 supra.
394. Obviously malpractice litigation affects professional practice. "Defensive
medicine", for instance, is one such negative effect. Because the optional panels are based
on the current fault concepts, they should not alter the deterrent effects of the present
system. See generally Brown & Rayne, Some Ethical Considerations in Defensive Psychia-
try: A Case Study, 59 Am J. ORTmoPsycmATRY 534, 534 (1989) (discussing how professional
self protection frequently motivates a psychiatrist's involuntary commitment decisions).
395. The current system of compensation is not sufficient by itself to significantly im-
prove the quality of care. See Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship Between Medi-
cal Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 Dunn LJ. 1197, 1203; Pierce, Encouraging
Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 Vim. L. REV. 1281, 1283
(1980); Shavell, Theoretical Issues in Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMCS OF 1M~ ICAL
MLPRACic 35, 49 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978).
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tients the options of using binding arbitration or an investigative
panel instead of the current public civil trial would allow them to
pursue legitimate claims while preserving the confidentiality of
very private information from therapy. The panels would be com-
posed of interdisciplinary teams of mental health professionals and
attorneys. They would use substantive tort law, but be free to fol-
low a more informal procedure. The optional panels would also
provide the opportunity to more quickly review malpractice claims.
Only if plaintiffs have the option to pursue mental health malprac-
tice claims in a nonpublic forum will the confidentiality of pa-
tients, long a hallmark of the mental health professions, be
ensured.
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